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The focus of this dissertation is on one of the many relationships that exist 
between the bureaucracy and government:  decision-making by elected representatives 
and the political influence of government employees on their decision-making.  
Specifically, it is with bureaucrats and the degree to which they may utilize political 
influence to create a disproportionate influence over government policy and decision-
making in the United States House of Representatives. 
I argue that the inherent qualities of bureaucrats suggest that they are significant 
and influential constituency for representatives.  They are an identifiable constituency to 
representatives, and have the means and opportunity to wield political influence.  
Therefore, I suggest that bureaucrats are a reelection constituency for representatives.  
My analysis suggests that representatives do indeed respond to government employees 
as a reelection constituency.   
The findings illustrate several conclusions.  First, bureaucrats have a moderating 
effect on the roll-call fiscal conservatism of representatives.  Secondly, the election cycle 
is revealed to have a mediating effect on this bureaucratic effect.   I demonstrate that 
representatives are more responsive to bureaucrats in the midterm congresses than in 
presidential congresses.  Finally, I identify a party effect on bureaucratic influence that 
suggests that Republicans representatives that are more attentive to government 
employees than Democrats.  I suggest that Democratic House members are already 
relatively liberal in their roll-call behavior on fiscal policy and a natural constituency for 
bureaucrats.  Conversely, Republicans may discover that they can cultivate this core 







“A government which robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul” 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
The bureaucracy has often been characterized as the fourth branch of 
government.  This characterization is the result of the depth and breadth of the 
bureaucracy’s influence in government. It is the means by which government interacts 
with the public by the implementation and administration of legislation or regulation.  
From obtaining a birth certificate to receiving Social Security or Medicare benefits, the 
bureaucracy is a companion of the average citizen over the course of their life.  While 
most may not even realize the pervasive nature of bureaucracy on their daily life, it is 
certainly the central means by which government attends to the need of the citizenry by 
the implementation of public policies and the way that the citizenry interacts with its 
government.   
The bureaucracy can be defined as a “professional corps of officials organized in 
a pyramidal hierarchy and functioning under impersonal, uniform rules and procedures” 
(Gerth, 1946).  In democratic government, the bureaucracy can be thought to be the 
apparatus that implements and administers the laws and regulations devised by the 
legislative branch, and processes and administers the public’s response to those laws 
and regulations.  In practice and experience, democratic governmental bureaucracy 
functions and behaves in a much more active and interdependent manner with the 
executive and legislative branches of government.  Governmental bureaucracy has 
ascended beyond a simple conduit by which government action is implemented, and has 
become an active participant in the polity and in policy making.  There can be little doubt 
that bureaucracy is a necessity for the functioning of government.  It is the form in which 
the implementation of law is carried out from which legislative and political intent is carried 
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forward.  Given its essential nature in the political system, bureaucracy’s influence, both 
real and imagined, on governmental operation and the political systems has intrigued 
political scholars.  This perceived influence has taken many scholarly forms, as scholars 
have examined the multifaceted nature of the bureaucracy’s relationship to the functioning 
of government (Meier, 1987; Rourke, 1984; Wood and Waterman, 1994; Borcherding, 
1977; Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981; Blais and Dion, 1991, Niskanen, 1971; Fiorina, 
1989).   
The focus of this dissertation is on one of the many relationships that exist 
between the bureaucracy and government:  decision-making by elected representatives 
and the political pressure of bureaucracies on their decision-making.  While bureaucracy 
maybe often described as a faceless, unthinking and monolithic enterprise, it is certainly 
more than simply that characterization.  As with any organization, a bureaucracy is also a 
collection of individuals.  It is with these individuals, the potentiality of their collective 
behavior, and the responsiveness of politicians to that collective behavior that this 
dissertation is concerned.  In other words, I am concerned with the degree to which 
bureaucrats-as-citizens have a disproportionate influence over government policy. 
One might suspect that there should be a readily discernible linkage between 
political actions or decisions and their antecedents in the socio-political environment.  
Scholarly inquiry into the nature of representation and the confluence of forces, both 
internal and external, that change political behavior has demonstrated the multiplicity of 
factors that may alter elected officials’ decision making.  It is true that politicians face many 
competing influences while formulating their political decision-making behavior, including 
the political environment, partisanship, ideology, and various constituencies or interest 
groups.  In this dissertation, I make the argument that bureaucrats  are indeed one of 
those constituencies.  Furthermore, the inherent qualities of these government employees 
make them a very significant and potentially very influential constituency.  Bureaucrats are 
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an easily identified sub-constituency to political actors, and have the means and motive to 
engage in the game of political control.  As will be demonstrated, politicians will respond to 
subgroup constituencies such as government employees.  There is simply too much at 
stake in the building of reelection constituencies to ignore the potential power that this 
subgroup may wield. 
The genesis of this notion that bureaucratic sub-constituencies influence elected 
representatives finds its beginnings in the work of several scholars, most notably 
Borcherding (1977), Niskanen (1971), and Fiorina (1989).  These scholars were interested 
in two aspects of bureaucratic influence on government:  (1) government growth, and (2) 
electoral success of incumbents.  Concerning government growth, scholars have identified 
two theories of bureaucratic impact in an attempt to link bureaucracies and bureaucrats to 
growth in the size of the public sector.  The bureaucratic information monopoly theory 
posits that bureaucracies, because they hold information advantages about the cost of 
government over their oversight committees in the legislature, are able to maximize their 
budgets and thereby contribute to increases in governmental expenditures.  The other, the 
bureau voting model, is not a mutually exclusive argument.  This theory suggests that the 
bureaucrats themselves, as self-interested actors, shape election outcomes to their 
advantage by supporting those candidates that most closely align themselves with higher 
government spending.  Of the many differences between these theories, perhaps the most 
notable is the environment in which government employees operate.  The bureaucratic 
information monopoly theory should be considered as reflecting an “internal” governmental 
relationship between the bureaucracy and government, as the functioning of it occurs 
within the governmental setting.  Conversely, the bureau voting model should be 
considered as reflecting an “external” relationship between the two actors, as the 
relationship occurs in the public electoral arena. 
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Scholars have also suggested that the bureaucracy is a contributor to the electoral 
success of incumbent politicians.  Morris Fiorina, in making his case for the reason behind 
the decline in competitive elections in U.S. House elections since the 1950’s, argues that 
incumbent politicians de-empathize controversial policy stands and partisan politics, and 
instead focus more on non-partisan constituent service, of which they rely heavily on the 
bureaucratic apparatus.  Therefore, so the theory goes, bureaucracies are both protected 
and enhanced due to the electoral advantage incumbent politicians gain by their use.  This 
theory may be considered to describe a relationship more institutional in nature between 
the bureaucracy and its government, as this constituency service occurs within the 
confines of a institutional governmental setting. 
 Theories of bureaucracies and government employees and their relationship to 
elected officials imply a symbiotic relationship.  This relationship is supported by more 
general scholarly research into the power and influence of bureaucracy (Rourke, 1984; 
Meier, 1987).  For our purposes, it also suggests several things about the potential for 
influence and mutual benefit between government employees and political actors.  The 
institutional bureaucracy has self-interest in maximizing its budget, has an inherent 
informational advantage over government, and performs vital tasks that benefit political 
actors in terms of electoral advantage.  Similarly, government employees may be though 
to also have self-interest in maximizing bureaucratic budgets and may have a significant 
and disproportional influence on the electoral success of political actors. 
What these arguments concerning bureaucracies as organizations and 
bureaucrats as political participants have in common is the potential to influence the 
decision-making of elected officials.  This influence is inherent to bureaucracies and to 
government employees by their location in the political environment.  Bureaucracies have 
informational advantages and vital services they perform for elected officials.  Government 
employees have a the potential to provide strong and disproportionate electoral support to 
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candidates that are more supportive government growth.  As such, they both focus on the 
self-interested desire to maximize government spending to support their continued 
existence and security.  Where they differ is in the mechanism by which this effect is 
accomplished.  For bureaucracies, this effect is institutional in nature and concerns the 
interaction of the bureaucracy and political actors in their institutional settings.  For 
government employees, this influence is exerted in the political and electoral environment 
by their constituency effects and concerns the electoral success of candidates that support 
the wants and desires of those bureaucrats. 
 In this dissertation, I examine this external electoral constituency aspect of 
bureaucratic influence. Given the various competing internal and external interests 
inherent to the representational decision-making process for politicians, I suggest that 
those external interests that are most closely aligned with election outcomes will have the 
shortest route to influencing the behavior of elected politicians.  Bureaucrats may well 
constitute just such an external constituency.  As the evidence will show, government 
employees have the potential to have a great impact on election outcomes.  It is both the 
psychology and reality of this context that may drive politicians to heed the wishes and 
desires of this subgroup or core constituency.   
 What motivates elected officials to be attentive to their constituencies?  Reelection.   
Legislators have many goals in their public life, from the creation of good public policies to 
the increasing of personal prestige and power within their institutions, but no desire or goal 
is greater than reelection.  It is reelection that allows for the continuation of these other 
pursuits.  This axiomatic rule of behavior for elected officials suggests one the reason that 
they will listen closely to those constituency groups that they consider important to their 
reelection outcomes (Fenno, 1978; Kingdon, 1989).  Beyond reelection concerns, it also is 
important to consider that elected officials will listen to their constituencies in general, to 
the degree that they consider themselves to be delegates to the preferences of their 
 6 
constituencies.  If legislators are indeed responsive to their constituencies, they should be 
especially responsive to those sub-constituencies that they identify as supportive 
electorally.  If such a relationship exists, this responsiveness should manifest itself most 
directly in the voting behavior of such politicians. 
 This dissertation will examine the roll-call voting behavior of Congressional 
members to determine if in fact this sub-constituency effect exists and examine the extent 
of its influence.   The focus of this research on the electoral constituency influence of 
government employees does not mitigate the importance of the institutional side of this 
potential effect.  The institutional effects are equally as interesting and important to 
understanding the relationship between bureaucracy, government, and political actors.  
Despite this importance, the nature of this theorized relationship places it outside of the 
realm of this dissertation.  Furthermore, these two aspects of bureaucratic persuasion  are 
certainly not mutually exclusive and instead are complementary in their theoretical 
underpinnings and components.  Any support identified for this electoral effect lends 
support to the institutional side of this relationship and will suggest further avenues for 
research and examination. 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 To investigate and understand how members of Congress can be influenced by 
government employees residing in their districts, we need to understand the motivations 
for both government bureaucrats and members of Congress.  Specifically, why should 
House members and senators give disproportionate weight to the views of public-sector 
employees?  What is it about public-sector employees that should have the potential for 
affecting the behavior of their elected representatives?  Do government employees have 
a definable self-interest that can influence members of Congress?  These questions, and 
others, should be established before a causal linkage is purported.  To answer these 
questions, the following chapters will review the literature concerning the influences on 
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representational process of legislators, suggest why and how government bureaucrats 
my impact upon that process, and finally,  provide unequivocal evidence that 
bureaucrats can and do impact the voting decisions of members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
 Specifically, Chapter 2 will examine the literature concerning the relationship 
between legislator’s and their constituents.  I will review the evidence for the 
responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies in general and the evidences of the 
existence of sub-constituencies within those broader constituencies.  Furthermore, I will 
relate the factors that mediate the relationship between legislators and constituents.  
Chapter 3 will offer evidence for government employees as a sub-constituency to 
members of the House of Representatives.  I will relate the values that government 
employees possess that make them attractive to legislators and the motivations that may 
drive bureaucrats to support certain candidates and oppose others.  Chapter 4 will set 
out the explicit modeling of the hypothesized relationship between government 
employees and representatives.  The operationalization of various measures that are 
incorporated into the modeling to properly specify and measure this relationship will be 
depicted, the model will be expressly identified, and the hypotheses to be tested will be 
described.  Chapter 5 will demonstrate the explanatory strength of the models specified 
in Chapter 4, and reveal the strong influence of government employees on the roll-call 
voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives.  The influence of party 
and the election cycle will also be inspected and shown to mediate the relationship 
between legislators and bureaucrats.  Finally, Chapter 6 will summarize the evidence 
collected and results observed in this dissertation.  I will opine on the value of the 
findings of this dissertation, explain what the findings tell us about the representational 




LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION: COMPETING INFLUENCES 
 
 If I am to suggest that government employees are a potentially powerful 
subgroup constituency to members of Congress, it should first be established that 
Representatives do indeed exhibit behavior that supports such a supposition.  As we will 
see, they do.  This type of representational linkage is most often examined by a study of 
the roll call voting behavior of elected officials as a function of some constituency 
attributes or pressure that these actors perceive from their constituencies. Typically, 
scholars develop measures of constituency policy preferences and legislative roll-call 
behavior, and then link the two measures in a multivariate model to ascertain the degree 
to which roll-call behavior is responsive to the policy views of legislative constituencies 
(Miller and Stokes, 1963; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979). 
Miller and Stokes (1963) are the starting point for the modern empirical 
examination of constituency effects on legislative roll-call behavior.  In their seminal 
1963 article, they estimate the extent of policy agreement between representatives and 
their district constituents based upon an election survey from the 1958 election cycle.  
The examined the correlation between constituent preferences and legislator 
preferences on the issues of (1) social welfare, (2) foreign affairs, and (3) civil rights.  
Surprising, Miller and Stokes found little policy agreement between the behavior of 
representatives and the preferences of their districts.  Their results indicated a strong 
relationship between roll-call behavior and constituency preferences for civil rights 
issues, but a significantly weaker correlation for social welfare issues and a negative 
relationship for foreign policy issues.  No doubt due to the nature of these findings, 
several scholars came to question the findings of Miller and Stokes and pursued 
alternatives in an attempt to explain the relative lack of constituency influence on 
legislators. 
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 Erikson (1978) contends that the lack of linkage found between legislators and 
their constituency is due to a significant amount of measurement error found in their 
analyses.  He is critical of the small sample of respondents for each congressional 
district and the non-random nature of this sample.  Erikson suggests that that sampling 
error for constituency preferences has resulted in the failure to accurately represent the 
linkage of constituent preferences and congressional behavior.  To correct for these 
problems, Erikson utilizes measures of simulated constituency preferences.  His solution 
of simulated constituency preferences is an approach designed to take advantage of 
demographic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge 
concerning the relationship between individuals' demographic characteristics and their 
policy positions.  First, Erikson uses survey data to estimate the relationship at the 
micro-level between individuals' various demographic characteristics and their opinions 
and preferences.  Second, once these individual-level regression estimates are 
obtained, the mean district characteristics on these independent variables are 
substituted into the regression model to yield predicted district-level opinion.  Erikson 
suggests that individual-level variables are related to individual-level opinion, it is highly 
probable that aggregations of those individual-level variables should be related to 
aggregations of district-level preferences.  He finds that this type of simulation has a 
stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures based on the small-sample 
estimates used by Miller and Stokes (1963).   
 Based on this alternative measure of constituency opinion, Erikson finds that 
Miller and Stokes significantly underestimated the influence of constituency preferences 
on congressional behavior.  Based on this respecification of the Miller and Stokes’ data, 
Erikson concludes that there is considerably more congressional responsiveness to 
constituency preferences than indicated by Miller and Stokes.  Furthermore, he argues 
that this responsiveness has two sources.  First, he suggests that such responsiveness 
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is somewhat inadvertent, since those legislators are members of their own 
constituencies.  Therefore, legislators maintain similar attitudes and values as those 
constituents, making such correlations partly a function of those antecedent conditions.  
More importantly however, Erikson does discover that winning candidates display higher 
correlations with district opinion than losing candidates, which suggests that there is an 
electoral connection associated with the constituent/legislator linkage. 
 From this early study of representative and constituent linkages, scholars have 
progressed to pursue what conditions influence the nature of this responsiveness.  
Theoretically, responsive roll-call behavior occurs when there is a strong relationship 
between constituency preferences and roll-call behavior--i.e., when legislators 
representing liberal (conservative) constituencies tend to be more liberal (conservative) 
in their roll-call voting than legislators representing more conservative (liberal) 
constituencies.  Because of the varied political and social environment in which the 
political system operates, it is not surprising that there are many varied conditions that 
may interfere with or strengthen the level of responsiveness between legislators and 
their constituencies.  The conditions that may mediate this relationship can be thought to 
divide into two distinct categories:  (1) legislator characteristics and (2) constituency 
characteristics.   
THE INFLUENCE OF LEGISLATOR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The characteristics that may affect the responsiveness of legislators to their 
constituencies involve both the personal characteristics of legislators and the political 
circumstances that a particular legislator may find in their political environment.  In terms 
of personal characteristics, seniority, retirement and personal perceptions are thought to 
affect the responsiveness of legislators to their constituencies.  The influence of seniority 
is thought to manifest itself by either insulating members from electoral pressures due to 
the benefits of incumbency, which may allow less responsiveness over time, or by 
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purging the unresponsive, which then leaves the remaining legislators as the most 
senior and the most responsive.  Retirees are also thought to be less compelled to follow 
the wishes of their constituents, as they will not face their wrath in the next election.  
Also, on a more fundamental level, it may be important to consider how legislators view 
themselves.  Are they trustees or delegates?  Do they take cues internally or externally 
when forming decisions?  These personal perceptions may color the way in which they 
operate legislatively and dissipate the influence of constituency on the roll-call behavior 
of certain legislators if they perceive their role as a trustee and not a delegate.  
Unfortunately, the difficulties in attaining legislator role orientations have limited the 
study of these characteristics in the legislative environment.   
Perhaps more importantly, the influence of election circumstance cannot be 
underestimated in its influence on the nature of legislative responsiveness.  The short-
term political environment in which legislators find themselves can have a significant 
impact on their responsiveness to their constituencies.  Because of the core assumption 
that most legislators desire reelection, they will be extremely attentive to the collection of 
constituencies that can influence election outcomes in their districts.  To this end, 
research has identified the influence of electoral victory margins on the responsiveness 
of political actors.  It is not surprising that such election-specific variations can signal 
electoral vulnerability or that such elections can effect legislator’s decision-making. 
Legislator Characteristics:  Seniority 
 
 As indicated earlier, legislative seniority is expected to have an influence on the 
level of responsiveness of legislators.  Surprisingly, most scholars have discovered that 
seniority seems to allow most legislators increased leeway with regard to their 
constituencies.  This leeway is due to the fact that more senior representatives have the 
inherent advantages of incumbency.  Advantages in name recognition, political capital, 
and political experience, make such representatives formidable foes in elections.  This 
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protection allows more senior legislators to follow other voting cues such as ideology or 
party, even if these cues are in conflict with the preferences of their constituencies.  
While investigating the mediating effect of election marginality on candidate 
responsiveness, Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) found results of interest on the impact of 
seniority.  In their analysis of the 1966 Congressional elections in the areas of civil rights, 
foreign affairs and domestic program responsiveness, the authors discover that 
increased seniority seems to provide incumbent representatives with insight into the 
preferences of their constituencies when compared to their challengers, as more senior 
incumbents are consistently closer to their constituencies in marginal districts.  
Interestingly, they also found that the advantages of incumbency allowed senior 
representatives to ignore those preferences, as more senior members achieved 
reelection almost 80% of the time even when challengers more accurately represented 
the simulated districts issue opinions.  Stone (1979) also finds indications that legislators 
may not change their behavior over time as their constituencies change their level of 
issue polarization.  In examining changes in issue responsiveness from 1956 to 1972, he 
concludes that “representatives do not necessarily change their behavior, yet changing 
mass opinion means the district as a whole loses because there is shaper polarization”.  
This supports the finding of Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) in that incumbency allows 
legislators the luxury of unresponsiveness, as they fail to respond to changes in district 
opinion in Stone’s analysis.  Stone surmises that any responsiveness is more the result 
of the initial similarity rather than a dynamic over time response by the representative. 
Also in concurrence with the initial finding of Sullivan and Uslaner, Hood and 
Morris (1998) find that incumbents often fail to reflect their district’s ideological 
preferences in their roll-call voting behavior.  In their analysis of southern congressional 
districts from 1983 to 1992, they find that liberal Democrats consistently replaced 
incumbent Democrats in the South mainly due to death, retirement, or resignation, but 
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not defeat.  Finally, Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) historical analysis of roll call voting 
suggests much the same for the seniority hypothesis.  By finding that great stability in 
the voting patterns of representatives, they further the idea that incumbents are relatively 
unresponsive to their constituencies.  Poole and Rosenthal suggest that members of 
Congress begin and maintain their ideological positions until they die, retire, or are 
defeated. 
Despite the previous findings that senior representatives can and do ignore the 
preferences of their constituents, some research has suggested that senior legislators 
are actually more responsive than others to their constituencies (Glazer and Robbins, 
1985; Zupan, 1990).  In their quasi-experimental research design, Glazer and Robbins 
(1985) attempt to gauge the change in responsiveness of legislators as their districts are 
altered by the decennial census and resulting reapportionment of their districts.  They 
hypothesize that more experienced representatives are better equipped to both 
acknowledge and adjust to their potential constituency change.  Their results indicate 
that those members that were more responsive to their constituency change had higher 
reelection rates.  In addition, they found that more senior members exhibited more 
responsiveness than less senor members.  Finally, Zupan (1990) examines the roll call 
behavior change in congressional members from 1976 to 1978 as a function of 
retirement or pursuit of another office.  He discovers that those members who decided to 
retire late in their term or decided to pursue another office have significant decreases in 
their responsiveness to their constituencies.  While not directly related to seniority, this 
finding does indicate that incumbent members are adjusting their personal ideology to 
accommodate the preferences of their constituencies.  Therefore, this finding lends 
support to the idea that incumbents do not completely disregard their constituencies, as 
some research has suggested is possible.   
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Legislator Characteristics:  Retirement 
 
 Various legislative scholars have also considered the influence of the decision to 
retire on legislative responsiveness and behavior (Hibbing, 1984; Jackson and King, 
1989; Lott and Reed, 1989; Zupan, 1990).  The rational behind this line of research is 
that desire for re-election is the primary reason legislators are responsive to their 
constituents.  Considering the fact that retiring legislators are unconstrained by the 
desire to be reelected, it is hypothesized that representatives who have chosen to retire 
will quite likely be less responsive to their constituents’ policy preferences than those 
colleagues who plan to run for reelection. 
 In his analysis of the retirement hypothesis, Hibbing (1984) finds support for the 
retirement hypothesis.  He finds that retiring representatives are significantly less likely 
to support transfer payments to their districts than non-retiring members.  Conversely, 
Lott and Reed (1989), have challenged this standard retirement hypothesis.  They argue 
that the problem with the retirement hypothesis is that the legislators most likely to retire 
are legislators with higher than average seniority and this seniority is quite likely due to 
their responsiveness to constituent’s preferences.  They suggest that that the political 
environment sorts out those politicians with policy preferences different from those of 
voters, resulting in legislators that have preferences that correspond with those of his 
constituents, regardless of retirement status. 
 Lott and Reed’s competing hypothesis is supported by a similar and more 
extensive analysis by Poole and Rosenthal (1997).  In their demonstration of the stability 
of the ideological voting patterns of representatives, they also find that the ideological 
voting patterns of retiring legislators do not significantly change following their decisions 
to retire.  Furthermore, Zupan (1990), finds that the correlations between simulated 
constituent ideologies and congressional voting ideology are no different between 
retiring and continuing representatives 
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Legislator Characteristics:  Role Orientation & Personal Ideology 
 
Legislator role orientation is another mediating factor in the responsiveness of 
legislators to their constituencies.  Due to the internal, psychological nature of role 
orientations, it has remained difficult to obtain data or information that is amenable to 
empirical research.  This type of information is only obtainable by the use of interviews of 
legislators.  Despite this limitation, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) have attempted to 
examine this elusive characteristic.  They contend that a stronger linkage between 
legislators and constituencies should occur when legislators believe themselves to be 
“delegates” for their constituents rather than “trustees” who use their own judgment in 
decision making.  The authors utilized interviews with members of the California 
legislature to determine their disposition toward a role orientation.  They also use an 
alternative measure of constituency preference.  The authors use the referenda and 
initiative voting returns by each legislative district as their measure of district opinion.  
This measure, while unavailable for Congressional level analysis of constituency 
preference, is certainly an improvement over other alternatives.  McCrone and Kuklinski 
find that a linkage does exist between constituent preferences and legislator behavior.  
They also discover significant differences between those legislators who considered 
themselves trustees or delegates.  Furthermore, the authors show that the consistency 
with which the constituency demonstrates its preference will make a difference in the 
perception of the legislators, although that finding is discussed more fully later.   
Related to this orientation factor is a legislator’s own personal preference on 
public policy.  It stands to reason that this personal preference would be more prevalent 
in those legislators who considered themselves to be trustees.  Beyond role orientation, 
the issue of personal preference by legislators is pervasive in the roll-call voting 
literature.  It is almost a prerequisite when discussing the influences on decision-making 
to identify the underlying personal preference of the legislator.  This characteristic can be 
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as elusive as role orientation.  Despite the nature of personal preference, most authors 
substitute this unknown with surrogates that can theoretically approach the identification 
of such preferences.  This surrogate is usually a legislator’s party identification or an 
interest group rating that is used to control this variation when examining other 
mediators into legislator’s roll-call behavior or examining trends in roll-call voting (Poole 
and Daniels, 1985; Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Segal, Cameron and Cover, 1992; 
Overby, Henschen, Walsh, and Strauss, 1992; LeVeaux and Garand, 2003; Bernstein, 
1989, Kingdon, 1989).  
Poole and Daniels (1985) and Poole and Rosenthal (1991) have aptly 
demonstrated the almost unitary dimensional nature of ideological cleavage in their 
examination of roll-call voting in Congress, which suggests the powerful nature of 
ideology and party in the determination of voting decisions by legislators.  Furthermore,  
they demonstrate the stability of this characteristic in legislators over time, which 
suggests that this core characteristic of legislators are not changeable over time and 
reinforces this indication of stable personal preference. 
The seminal work by Kingdon (1989) provides good evidence of the significance 
of the personal preferences of legislators in their decision-making.  By conducting 
interviews with members of the U.S. House of Representatives during 1969, Kingdon is 
able to obtain the unique insight into the decision-making process and the relative 
influence of differing forces on that decision-making process.  While there are many 
significant findings in Kingdon’s explanation of his “Consensus Mode” of decision-
making by legislators, the most fundamental for our purposes here is that legislator’s 
incorporate their own conception of good public policy into their decision-making.  This 
personal preference manifests itself indirectly by following the cues of fellow 
representatives and directly by their own ideological conception and the need for voting 
consistency.  Where there is conflict between the forces and goals of legislators, 
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Kingdon finds that legislators will vote their policy preference consistently on low and 
medium salience issues and split their behavior between constituency, intra-Washington 
influence and policy preference on high salience issues.  Clearly from Kingdon’s 
research, personal preference is a significant force in the decision-making process of 
legislators, and therefore mediates the responsiveness of those legislators to their 
constituencies. 
Legislator Characteristics:  Electoral Circumstance 
 
The political circumstances in which legislators find themselves are also potential 
mediators on their responsiveness to their constituencies.  For our purposes, these 
political conditions are related to the election cycle and the effect that these conditions 
may have on the nature of representation by legislators.  In particular, this political 
circumstance is a competitive election.  It is certainly plausible to assume that 
incumbents who are facing a potentially strong challenge where they have only recently 
won a hotly contested election may be more attuned to the wants and desires of their 
district constituents than an incumbent who is not faced with a competitive district.  As 
the election cycle draws near, politicians perceiving an electoral threat will begin to listen 
to the preferences of their constituents with more focus, in the effort to appear 
responsive and in-tune to their district, and to stave off any further serious challenge to 
their reelection.   
The electoral condition in which a winning candidate has fallen short of some 
pre-determined threshold of the popular vote in their previous is termed a “marginal” 
election.  This threshold is typically 55% or 60%, and those incumbents whose previous 
election falls within that threshold are argued to be “marginal” and subject to a significant 
electoral challenge and therefore a higher likelihood of defeat.  The idea is that 
incumbents representing these marginal, or electorally competitive districts, face a 
higher degree of electoral threat.  Thus the argument is that those legislators who find 
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themselves in these types of electoral circumstances will become more attuned to their 
constituencies in the hope of staving off electoral defeat and ending the perception of 
vulnerability to potential challengers.  Because of the potential to explain such significant 
political events as election outcomes, incumbency advantage, constituency 
responsiveness, the occurrence of electoral marginality has received great attention by 
scholars.  In terms of electoral marginality’s effect on the legislator-constituency linkage, 
early debate seems to have settled upon the existence of an increase in responsiveness 
when incumbents have experienced a marginal election.   
Early scholars such as MacRae (1952) and Shannon (1968) found the existence 
of marginal election effects.  In several studies of state legislative behavior, these 
scholars found that legislators from marginal districts are less loyal to party in their roll-
call voting than were legislators from safe districts.  This finding suggested that 
legislators increased their responsiveness to their constituencies and away from partisan 
loyalty when reelection was questionable.  These findings have been challenged by 
several authors who found conflicting results.  By the inclusion of simulated constituent 
preferences, both Miller (1970) and Fiorina (1973) argue that they provided a truer test 
of the responsiveness of legislators to their constituents.  Based upon their findings, they 
suggest that the linkage between constituent preferences and legislator roll-call behavior 
is not significantly altered by electoral marginality   
More recent research appears to clear up this early controversy over the impact 
of electoral marginality.  In his examination of legislative roll-call behavior in the 1971 
California legislature, Kuklinski (1977) finds some support for the marginality hypothesis.  
He examined the responsiveness of legislators on the policy dimensions of 
contemporary liberalism, taxation and government administration and found that 
legislators that experience more competitive elections are more responsive to their 
constituencies on taxation policy.  He also found that those legislators from competitive 
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districts are also less likely to vote with their party.  This suggests that that the impact of 
competition may have the effect of reorienting legislators.   
Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) also investigate the mediating effect of election 
marginality on candidate responsiveness.  In their analysis of the 1966 Congressional 
elections in the areas of civil rights, foreign affairs and domestic program 
responsiveness, they test two alternative interpretations to the marginality hypothesis.  
First, they examine if marginal incumbents will converge to the positions of their 
constituents; and second, if marginal incumbents will converge to the positions of their 
opponents.  They discovered that candidates tended to diverge from each other in 
marginal districts and that candidates who are closest to the constituency opinion were 
considerably more likely to win than their opponent.  Furthermore, analysis by Campbell 
(1981) suggests that controversy concerning the influence of electoral margins is 
partially due to an incorrect specification of marginality.  He argues that the relationship 
between district competitiveness and congressional responsiveness has been incorrectly 
specified.  Instead of a linear relationship as assumed in previous studies, Campbell 
argues that the relationship is curvilinear in nature.  In his analysis, the introduction of 
the curvilinear effect demonstrated the significant effect of marginality on legislative 
responsiveness.  Finally, recent analysis by Bartels (1991) demonstrates the 
unequivocal influence of marginality on the responsiveness of legislators to their 
constituents.  In his examination of roll-call voting and defense spending, Bartels finds 
the linkage between constituency preference and legislative voting behavior is 
significantly stronger for members from marginal districts than those of safe districts. 
THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The character of the political environment may also intervene on the linkage 
between legislators and their constituencies.  In spite of the demonstration that 
constituencies have a important and significant effect on legislative roll-call behavior, 
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there is relatively little empirical research into the effect of variation in that constituency 
on such roll-call behavior.  While a substantial amount of research has focused on the 
effects of various legislator conditions such as seniority and electoral conditions on the 
representational linkage between legislators and their constituencies, significantly less 
research has examined the effect of changes in the nature of various constituent 
conditions on representation. 
 Kingdon (1989) provides good evidence for the effect of constituencies on 
the voting decisions of legislators.  In his book, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions, 
Kingdon examines the many influences on legislator’s voting decisions, including 
constituencies, fellow representatives, party leadership, the executive branch, staff, and 
media.  Kingdon argues that constituency influence is of substantial importance.  Based 
on his interviews of Representatives on their decision-making, he finds that they vote 
with their constituency over 75% of the time when they perceive a position from their 
constituency.  Furthermore, they spontaneously mention constituency 37% of the time 
when explaining his decision-making calculations, second only to his discussions with 
fellow representatives.  Kingdon does indicate that this constituency influence can be 
altered by the intensity of preference from the constituency on any particular issue or 
policy, and weigh the constituency more on those issues that are of high intensity.  If the 
issues are of low intensity to a member’s constituency, they will vote their own 
preference.  When there is conflict between the representative and the constituency on 
high intensity issues, the representatives tends to seek other actors for advice and 
attempt to either redefine the conflict.  The conclusion to be reached concerning 
constituency effect is that it is significant and of paramount importance to legislators and 
usually eclipses other influences on their voting decisions. 
Similarly, Glazer and Robbins (1985) provide strong evidence that constituency 
characteristics do matter in the representative process.   The authors utilize the 1980 
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census and resulting reapportionment cycle to create a quasi-experimental design.  
They examine whether or not changes in a House district alters member’s roll-call voting 
behavior.  The authors first calculate the relationship between the district presidential 
vote and the conservative coalition score for each district’s legislator created by the 
Congressional Quarterly.  This resulting relationship is then used to create a predicted 
change in the conservative coalition score based upon changes in the presidential vote 
in the reapportioned district.  This prediction is then entered into a model explaining the 
legislator’s conservative coalition score in 1982 in the reapportioned district.  They 
hypothesize that representatives will adjust their voting behavior to the ideological 
change in their district.  What they find is that representatives do indeed change their 
voting behavior to accommodate changes in their constituencies.  Those legislators who 
were reelected in 1982 were significantly more responsive to constituent changes than 
those legislators that were not reelected.  Responsiveness does seem to matter for the 
goal of reelection, which undoubtedly incumbents realize.  As mentioned earlier, this 
effect is much more significant in more senior members of the House of 
Representatives.  Glazer and Robbins argue that the selection process of elections 
parses out the less responsive candidates and rewards those candidates that are more 
responsive and a better reflection of the constituencies that they represent. 
The evidence suggests that constituency characteristics do influence the 
representational behavior of legislators.  Beyond this fact, there are several aspects of a 
legislator’s constituency that may effect the nature of that responsiveness or mediate the 
effectiveness of the voice of that constituency (Ardoin and Garand, 2003).  First, the 
heterogeneity of a constituency may create uncertainty in the responsiveness of 
legislators.  If the signals that emanate from the district constituency are too diverse or 
mixed, effective responsiveness becomes difficult.  Secondly, the level of political 
sophistication and engagement by a district constituency may have an effect.  If a district 
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contains greater numbers of sophisticated or engaged voters, it stands to reason that a 
legislator would be inclined to respond with more ease and with the knowledge that his 
or her decision-making was monitored by the electorate.  Since reelection is the ultimate 
goal, the larger these constituencies, the more apt a legislator may be to respond.  
There may be subgroups within district constituencies that have a disproportionate 
influence on the responsiveness of legislators.  These sub-groups within a constituency 
may have a greater centralization or gravitation to an issue or policy.  It is this 
centralization that separates them from the remaining constituency.  It may be the case 
that these core constituencies are vital for the reelection efforts of legislators. 
Constituency Characteristics:  Heterogeneity 
 
It is a compelling rationale that the relative unanimity of a legislator’s 
constituency can have an impact the amount of responsiveness that will result from that 
legislator.  Just such an argument is suggested by Ardoin and Garand (1996).  They 
argue that homogeneous districts will have constituencies that have relatively 
homogeneous interests when compared to more heterogeneous districts.  They contend 
that when legislators receive unequivocal signals from their constituents, they are less 
likely to deviate from the policy preferences of those constituents.  Therefore, the 
legislator/constituency responsiveness linkage should be stronger in such districts.  If the 
message is clear, the responsibility for not adhering to that message could lead to a 
more significant electoral challenge.  Following this argument, they further suggest that 
heterogeneous constituencies should convey more conflicting or ambiguous signals to 
their representatives and therefore provide legislators with few tangible constituency 
messages with which to make roll-call decisions.  In a test of this hypothesis with the 
U.S. Senate, Ardoin and Garand find that when homogenous constituencies generate 
clear policy signals, senators strongly link their roll-call behavior to constituency 
preferences.  Conversely, if constituency policy preferences are confused or conflicted 
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by more heterogeneous constituencies, the linkage becomes attenuated.  The authors 
conclude that U.S. senators do vary their responsiveness to the ideological preferences 
of their constituents based upon the clarity of signals that they perceive.   
Similar support is found in Bailey and Brady’s (1998) analysis of Senate votes on 
free trade policy.  They find constituency variables related to support for free trade 
followed legislator voting behavior more closely for senators from homogenous states.  
Based upon this evidence, the authors concluded that the evidence supported the 
hypothesis that constituent heterogeneity influences congressional responsiveness.   
Constituency Characteristics:  Political Engagement 
 
It has also been suggested that the political acumen and activity of constituents 
may influence how legislators translate that constituency’s preferences into roll-call 
votes.  This hypothesis founded on the argument that those constituencies that are more 
sophisticated and/or politically active will have a much more accurate and informed idea 
of the policy positions and roll-call behavior of their representative.  This clarity of 
information should make it much easier for those constituencies to hold their legislator 
accountable for their decisions. 
A test of this hypothesis is the focus of research by Jackson and King (1989).  In 
their analysis of House member’s roll call voting decisions on the 1978 Tax Reform Act, 
they find that the political engagement of constituents does not have a significant 
influence on the responsiveness of legislators.  However, research by Ardoin and 
Garand (1996) suggests some support for this hypothesis.  In their analysis of 
representation in the U.S. Senate from 1976 through 1992, the authors find that 
representation of state constituent ideology in senate roll call behavior increases as the 





Constituency Characteristics:  Core Constituencies 
 
 While the research of Glazer and Robbins is certainly instructive to the effects of 
general constituency change on voting behavior, other scholars have used similar 
methodology or similar hypothesizes to discern other changes in constituency on changes 
in voting. (Wright, 1989; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996; LeVeaux and Garand, 2003)   
These authors have attempted to examine the influence of more detailed or distinct 
subgroups within a legislator’s constituency.  It is suggested by these authors and others 
that these subgroups may hold greater sway with legislators than the larger, more defuse 
general constituency. 
 This hypothesis concerning subgroups finds its beginnings in the work of Richard 
Fenno (1978) and later in the work of John Kingdon (1989).  Both authors give life to the 
idea of sub-constituencies and their effect on legislators.  While Fenno uses the distinction 
to describe the political environment that legislator’s themselves perceive in their districts, 
Kingdon goes further to indicate the political influence such constituencies may have on a 
legislator’s voting behavior.   
 In his seminal work, Fenno argues that there are four levels of constituency from 
the perspective of the members of Congress that he interviewed.  These levels of 
constituency are: (1) Geographic; (2) Reelection; (3) Primary; and (4) Personal.  Fenno 
describes the geographical constituency as the legal boundaries and full population of a 
district, with the main characteristic differentiating characteristic being the relative 
homogeneous or heterogeneous nature of the constituency of the district.  The personal 
constituency is only the very few individuals that go beyond even the legislator’s most 
ardent supporters.  These individuals are the member’s closest family and friends that are 
both politically and emotionally supportive of his or her efforts.  It is the remaining two 
levels of constituency that are of the most interest in the defining of a core constituency.  
The reelection constituency is considered to be a legislator’s political supporters.  They are 
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the sections of the geographic constituency that have supported the candidate previously 
are often targeted for mobilization by the candidate.  Fenno argues that this reelection 
constituency is most important in competitive elections, as they can be counted as 
supporters and voters in a close election.  Finally, the primary constituency is that 
collection of supporters in the reelection constituency that the legislator considers his 
strongest supporters.  They constitute the campaign workers and financial contributors to 
the reelection effort, and are differentiated by the consistency and intensity with which they 
support their candidate.  Fenno’s interviewees often characterize this primary constituency 
as their political base or nucleus. 
 Kingdon (1989) also identifies the existence of sub-constituencies in a legislator’s 
district.  In identifying the multitude of actors that impinge upon the decision-making of 
members of Congress, he suggests that constituencies are complex and made up of many 
subgroups, some politically active and others not active.  Those subgroups, when 
politically active or involved in governmental policy areas, are characterized by Kingdon as 
district elites.  Some of these elites form either a “supporting coalition” or a “electoral 
supporting coalition” for the legislator in their district.  In placing the importance of 
constituency in the voting decision, Kingdon’s evidence indicates that: 
  “…the presence of elites in the congressman’s perceptual map  
  of constituency, whether there because of the overt elite activity 
  or because he takes account of those groups independent 
  of their activity, considerably enhances the importance of the 
  constituency in his decision” 
 
 Other research has attempted to identify core constituencies in legislator’s districts 
which may fit this pattern of persuasion.  Wright (1989) examines the relative influence of 
different constituencies on the roll-call voting of U.S. Senators from 1981 to 1984.  He 
finds that party affiliation and constituency ideology both have a strong effect on the voting 
behavior of Senators.  Furthermore, Wright finds that incumbents are much more 
responsive to independent party identifiers and to party elite preferences than the 
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remaining constituency of their states.  Wright’s finding suggests that incumbent senator’s 
are able to identify core constituencies within their larger statewide constituency and 
respond to that core constituency with more intensity and interest than the larger 
constituency. 
 Several authors have looked to race and a potential indicator of a core 
constituency (Leveaux and Garand, 2003; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996).  The argument 
presented by these authors is that legislators of different parties may respond differently 
to the policy views or electoral strength of segments within their constituencies.  
Particularly, the argument is that Democrats and Republicans respond differently to 
changes in the racial composition of their district following demographic changes 
associated with the decennial reapportionment of legislative districts.  Because 
Democratic candidates historically receive the African-American vote and usually 
depend on it for electoral success, they should certainly be very responsive to changes 
in that constituency.  Conversely, since Republican candidates do not depend on the 
African-American vote for electoral victory, they should be unmoved by changes in that 
demographic.  In short, blacks make up a large core constituency for Democrats, but not 
for Republicans. 
 Overby and Cosgrove (1996) use the 1990 reapportionment cycle to determine if 
changes in the racial composition of reapportioned districts affect the voting behavior of 
white incumbent Representatives in 1993.  The authors find that Democratic House 
members are responsive to changes in district racial composition, but that Republican 
House members are not.   This finding suggests that Democratic incumbents are sensitive 
to the changes in a sub-group of their larger constituency.  Furthermore, the lack of 
responsiveness by Republicans to this change in racial composition suggests that 
subgroup constituencies may apply to only certain candidates, dependent upon their 
characteristics.   
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 Also, Leveaux and Garand, (2003), utilize similar methodology to identify changes 
in incumbent roll-call voting associated with changes in racial composition of their 
reapportioned districts.  They find that Republican House members whose districts 
underwent increases in black population do not change their voting behavior to reflect that 
change.  Instead, Republican House members actually respond negatively, which 
indicates that Republicans representing districts with relatively significant black 
populations after reapportionment actually shift their roll-call behavior in the conservative 
direction.  The authors suggest that when “Republican incumbents are confronted with 
substantial black subpopulations in their districts; they appear to target their 
representational behavior toward their (presumably) more conservative white constituents 
than toward their black constituents.”  Conversely, Democratic House members are 
responsive to changes in black population due to redistricting.  They shift their roll-call 
behavior in a more liberal direction as a function of those changes.  The authors also add 
a test of general responsiveness to general constituency changes due to reapportionment.  
This test demonstrates that both parties respond in kind to this general change with 
changes in their voting behavior.  This finding suggests that while both party’s incumbents 
are responsive to the preferences of their constituents in general terms, they respond 
differently to an important Democratic core constituency.  This finding further reinforces 




This chapter has reviewed the literature that explores the relationship between 
legislators and the constituencies that they represent.  The findings of this literature 
certainly demonstrate the significant influence that constituencies have in the decision-
making calculus by legislators.  Evidence has also demonstrated that there are many 
mediating factors that effect the relationship between legislators and their constituencies.  
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These characteristics include both the personal characteristics and political 
circumstances of legislators and the characteristics of the constituencies of legislators. 
The unequivocal finding that constituencies do matter in the decision-making of 
legislators is critical for the purposes of this dissertation.  If I am to purport that 
government employees have an effect on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators, It is 
vital to have empirical and theoretical support showing that constituencies are important 
to the legislators.  A review of the literature demonstrates the importance of 
constituencies to the behavior of representatives.  Furthermore, research illustrates that 
subgroups within the constituency can have a greater influence on the voting behavior of 
representatives than the more diffuse population of a district.  Again this finding is vital 
for the relationship that I hypothesize is in effect between bureaucrats and elected 
representatives.  If core constituencies can exist and disproportionately effect the 
behavior of representatives, the potential for government employee to function as a core 




A BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING 
 
The weight of the evidence brought forth by scholars suggests that constituency 
does matter in the decision-making process of legislators.  Evidence also points to the 
ability of political actors to identify sub-groups within their constituencies and respond 
differently to those sub-groups when compared to the remaining general constituency.  
Further, an examination of the multitude of forces that mediate this relationship between 
legislators and their constituents has shown that there are indeed many personal and 
environmental characteristics that can and do effect the intensity and cohesiveness of 
that relationship.   
In general, it can be said with some confidence that constituencies do matter in 
the roll-call decision-making of legislators and that those legislators do indeed make 
distinctions between different segments of their constituencies.  They appear to have the 
ability and the motivation to identify segments within their constituency that they consider 
to be strong supporters and vital to the goal of reelection.  Whether these segments are 
the reelection or primary constituencies described by Fenno (1978) or the supporting 
coalitions described by Kingdon (1989), they do seem to exist.  Furthermore, there 
certainly seems to be willingness or even necessity for candidates to subdivide their 
constituencies to promote their reelection bids. 
ELECTORAL DYNAMICS AND CORE CONTITUENCIES 
 
It certainly makes good political sense to identify sub-groups within a 
constituency that a candidate feels will support them above and beyond the remainder of 
that constituency.  Electoral dynamics and the political environment have begun to 
promote the elections of candidates instead of simply partisan choices (Wattenberg, 
1996).   
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Wattenberg provides a wealth of evidence to argue that the electorate has 
become more independent or at least less attached to their partisan identification.  As 
such, the electorate has become less dependent of partisan identification as a voting 
cue and as a perceptual screen through which they evaluate candidates.  He points to 
decline in self-reported partisan identification, the rise in split-ticket voting, the increase 
in individuals offering “no-preference” as their party choice, and the growing feeling of 
neutrality toward parties as evidence for this decline in the importance of party in the 
electorate.  Wattenberg suggests that these trends are significant, even as some 
evidence has suggested that weakened self-reporting of party identification has not 
altered the partisan voting behavior of those individuals (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, 
Westlye and Wolfinger, 1992).  As a result of these changes, he suggests that 
candidates have the opportunity to create their own reelection constituencies to enhance 
their reelection effort. 
Candidate centered elections seem to increase the likelihood of targeting core 
constituencies.  As candidates search their constituencies for those groups that will work 
for their personal election and be counted on to participate on election day.   The 
cultivation of segments of a constituency that have the means and motive to both 
support and vote for a candidate, above and beyond simple partisan identification, is 
extremely good politics.   
The importance of the identification of supportive sub-group constituencies is 
further enhanced by the changing nature of the electoral process.  While the rise in 
candidate-centered elections has created the need to solicit constituencies that can be 
counted on for support beyond the voting cue of partisanship, this effect may be 
exacerbated by the decline in turnout over the past three decades.  Presidential election 
year turnout has declined, as a proportion of voting age population, from a high of 63% 
in 1960 to its current level of 51% from the 2000 election.  The Congressional election 
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turnout has followed the same pattern.  Congressional election year turnout in 1962 was 
47% and reached a low of 36.4 in the 1998 mid-term election cycle.  Recent research by 
McDonald and Popkin (2001), has suggested most of this decline can be attributed to 
measurement error in the calculation of voting age population.  They argue that once 
non-citizens and felons are subtracted out of the voting age population, the voting 
eligible population that is left is the truer measure the examination of turnout rates.  One 
this clarified measure is utilized; the declines average a much more modest five percent 
in both congressional and presidential elections.  What doesn’t change is the 
consistently lower turnout between congressional and presidential elections.  The rate of 
turnout is consistently 15 to 20 percent lower during congressional elections.   
Perhaps the most interesting explanation for this turnout decline has been put 
forth by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and their findings regarding the reasons behind 
turnout decline remain important to explaining the differences between presidential and 
congressional turnout rates.  Furthermore, this research also contributed validity to the 
hypothesis that candidates search for sub-constituencies.  Let’s first summarize the 
findings of Rosenstone and Hansen.  They argue that the decline in turnout can be 
traced to two factors.  First, they argue that the characteristics of the electorate can 
explain about half of the decline.  These characteristics included a younger, less 
politically experienced electorate; a weakened sense of social involvement; declining 
feelings of efficacy; and weakened attachment to political parties and candidates.  The 
other half of the equation that has produced the decline in participation is the lack of 
mobilization by candidates and parties.  They give evidence on several fronts for this 
mobilization decline.  First, they demonstrate that partisan mobilization has declined, 
with parties replacing labor-intensive canvassing methods with money-intensive media 
strategies.  Second, they show that electoral competition has declined, which makes the 
need for mobilization to decline.  Thirdly, they illustrate that the demand for limited 
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campaign resources has climbed due to increases in contested primaries.  This demand 
thinned the resources of both candidates to mobilize and voters to participate.  Finally, 
they explain that social movement activity has declined, leaving fewer opportunities to 
engage and motivate large numbers of voters.  The conclude that: 
“The actions of parties, campaigns, and social movements 
mobilize public involvement in American elections.  The “blame” 
for declining voter turnout, accordingly, rests on political leaders  
as on citizens themselves” 
 
What is most interesting for our purpose of providing supporting evidence for the 
pursuit of sub-groups by candidates?  It is the underlying findings of Rosenstone and 
Hansen regarding the scope and bias of the political mobilization that occurs.  They 
conclude that candidates, parties, and interest groups attempt to mobilize individuals 
that are (1) affluent, (2) identifiable and accessible, and (3) likely to respond and be 
effective.  Mobilization efforts by candidates and parties are targeted toward those 
groups in their constituencies that are expected to be supportive.  These mobilization 
efforts have a great similarity to the reelection/primary or supporting coalition 
constituencies identified by Fenno (1978) and Kingdon (1989).  Rosenstone and Hansen 
conclude that “democratic government provides few incentives for leaders to attend to 
the needs of people who neither affect the achievement of their policy goals nor 
influence the perpetuation of their tenure in office”.  Evidently, the identification and 
mobilization of those core constituencies that support and vote for a candidate are those 
groups that will see responsiveness from legislators.   
Ultimately, the more candidate-centered electoral process and the increase in 
targeted mobilization suggest that core constituency identification may be an important 
consideration to representatives seeking reelection.  Also, the lower participation rate 
evident in congressional elections suggests that the pursuit of core constituencies could 
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be more important to electoral success at the mid-term than in presidential election 
years. 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AS A CORE CONSTITUENCY 
 
Previous literature has identified several sub-groups that may match the 
requirements that characterize core constituencies (Leveaux and Garand, 2003; Overby 
and Cosgrove, 1996; Wright, 1989).  It is certainly plausible that other subdivisions within 
legislator’s constituencies may exist.  These subgroups may also be amenable to 
mobilization and reliable for political support.  I speculate in this dissertation that 
government employees are one such potential constituency sub-group.   
Where does one look for the evidence that government employees may qualify 
as a distinct sub-constituency able to deliver political support above and beyond others 
in a legislator’s district?  I find the evidence of motive and opportunity in the literature on 
government growth.  The findings associated with this literature provide the evidence 
that bureaucrats may indeed be a core constituency worthy of responsiveness by 
legislators.  Furthermore, the identification of bureaucrats as a important sub-group 
constituency would also clarify and lend validity to the Bureau voting model’s contention 
of bureaucratic influence on the growth of government. 
Bureaucratic Influence on Government Growth 
 
The influence of bureaucracy on the political system has been the focus of 
numerous scholars (Niskanen, 1971; Sears and Citrin, 1982; Meier, 1975; Rourke, 1976; 
Borcherding, 1977).  These scholars have examined the role and influence of 
bureaucracies and government employees in the decision-making and behavior of 
government.  One such aspect of government behavior that has received a substantial 
amount of attention concerns the role of government employees in increasing the size of 
the public sector.  Beginning with Niskanen's (1971) influential work, numerous scholars 
have explored the role of the "budget-maximizing bureaucrat" in shaping the size of the 
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public sector (Garand, 1988; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Borcherding, 1977; 
Blais and Dion, 1991; Lowery and Berry, 1983; Sears and Citrin, 1982).  Typically, these 
scholars work under the theoretical assumption that government employees are self-
interested utility maximizers who seek expanded budgets for government departments 
and agencies, particularly their own.  According to this view, the size of government 
grows, at least in part, because government employees seek to expand government 
services to levels beyond that which would be demanded by citizens. 
 Much of the literature that examines the influence of government employees on 
the size of government is based on the this core premise that government employees 
act as rational, self-interested political actors who support increases in the size of the 
public sector for their own well-being.  Public bureaucrats are depicted as using 
whatever advantages they can muster over elected policy makers or politicians to 
ensure a steady and, if possible, increasing flow of funds for their agencies and 
departments.  This general theory is a seductive one that commands examination when 
exploring the explanations for government growth. 
 Theoretically, what advantages do public bureaucrats have over elected officials, 
particularly those in the U.S. Congress?  Scholars who make the assumption of self-
interested, budget-maximizing bureaucrats point to two processes in which government 
employees exercise a degree of influence over members of Congress. These processes 
provide the core of two related, but competitive, theories of the effects of public 
bureaucrats on the roll-call behavior of legislators: The Bureaucratic Information 
Monopoly Model and the Bureau voting model.  Both are intriguing, but the Bureau 
voting model is of the most interest in discerning the ability of government employees to 





The Bureau-Information Monopoly Model 
 
 The first explanation, termed the "bureau information monopoly" model by 
Niskanen (1971), proposes that government employees, acting in their own self-interest, 
use the policy information advantages available to them to their benefit when dealing 
with Congress or the President over budget allowances.  He argues that that the link 
between bureaucracy and government growth can be explained and modeled from an 
economic theory, as opposed to more traditional sociological approaches.  This 
economic foundation is based on the assumption that bureaucrats are budget 
maximizers, who seek increasingly large budget appropriations to create job security 
and greater life satisfaction.  For Niskanen, the power mechanism used by bureaucrats 
to orchestrate these higher budgets is information. The bureau information monopoly 
model suggests that bureaucrats have substantial information advantages over 
members of the explicitly political branches of government.  To this end, bureaucrats use 
their monopolistic control of government output and information about the true costs to 
supply this output in an effort to secure higher budget allowances.  It is argued that 
larger budgets increase the likelihood that bureaucrats will obtain greater personal 
benefits (e.g., higher salaries), increase the discretion that they have over their work 
lives, promote public policies that they and their agencies support, create a happy 
clientele, and generally insulate themselves from the political branches of government.  
Since most elected officials cannot compete with the bureaucracy in the control of 
information relevant to public policy-making, they must give at least some deference to 
the spending goals of government agencies and departments. 
Ultimately, the level of empirical support for the bureau information monopoly 
theory is very limited.  The paramount difficulty with empirical analyses of this model is 
assessing the degree to which the bureaucracy has a monopoly on information relevant 
to policy making.  Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate whether or not information 
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monopolies are translated directly into legislative decisions that are favorable to the 
budgetary preferences of public bureaucrats. 
The Bureau Voting Model 
  
 The bureau voting model suggests that the growth and maintenance of the size 
of government is significantly affected by the advantages in voting power that 
government employees have over other citizens.  First, as with the bureau information 
monopoly, government employees are assumed to have stronger preferences for 
greater spending than other citizens.  Second, they are expected to translate those 
preferences into greater electoral support for candidates for office who are willing to 
promote an expanded public sector.  One of the keys components of this model is the 
expectation that government employees are more likely than other citizens to cast votes 
on election day.  If this assumption is true, candidates who support greater government 
spending would be advantaged by the support that they are likely to receive from a 
group of voters (i.e., government employees) who are likely to turn out in greater 
numbers and may well identify and respond to this group as a core constituency.  
According to this argument, the end result is a greater tendency for candidates who 
support an expanded public sector to win on election day.  Empirical evidence for the 
bureau voting model should manifest itself in differences in the ideological and attitudinal 
dispositions, political participation, and vote choice between bureaucrats and the 
remaining public. 
There is a substantial amount of empirical support for the bureau-voting model, 
though the findings of previous research are not necessarily definitive.  Scholars have 
generally found significant differences between government employees and other 
citizens in their partisanship, ideological orientation, and attitudes toward government 
spending, but these differences are not stark on most issues (Garand, Parkhurst, and 
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Seoud, 1991; Blake, 1991; Lewis, 1990; Blair and Garand, 1995; Sears and Citrin, 1982; 
Aberbach and Rockman, 1976; Cole and Caputo, 1979; Meier, 1975).  
In his research into representative bureaucracy, Meier finds that public 
employees take a consistently more liberal position concerning issues and party 
identification in 1972.  While not directly related to spending preferences, these findings 
do suggest the respondent’s liberalism and inclination to support a larger public sector.  
Aberbach and Rockman (1976) and Cole and Caputo (1979) also discover a liberal bias 
in the career bureaucracy during the Nixon administration.  They find that career 
bureaucrats have higher rates of support than political appointees for increased social 
service provision by the federal government, and lower support for administration 
policies.  They also reveal that career civil servants are also much more likely to identify 
with the Democratic Party.  Despite these findings of differing policy and spending 
attitudes between the bureaucracy and private citizens or other civil servants, 
conclusions need to be taken with some reservation.  These reservations are based on 
individual-level survey research done by Lewis (1990), who finds that the attitudes of 
government employees, including government spending preferences, are not 
significantly different from the rest of the population.  This discovery runs contrary to 
other individual-level survey research conducted by Sears and Citrin (1982) and Garand 
et al., (1991), who find significant attitudinal differences between government employees 
and the general population. 
Sears and Citrin take a direct approach by the investigation of the attitudinal 
differences between government employees and the general public toward the tax-revolt 
measures of California.  They contend that bureaucrats should differ in their attitudes 
based on a rational self-interest to support measures which promote the continuation of 
government funding for their respective agencies and jobs.  They find significant 
differences between the public employees and the remaining population, with 
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bureaucrats less supportive of the tax-revolt measures by an average of 41 percent to 
65 percent.   
 Garand et al. (1991) also investigate the attitudinal differences between 
bureaucrats and the general public.  The authors utilize a direct individual level analysis 
of attitudinal differences, based on data from the American National Election Studies 
from 1982, 1984, and 1986.  Questions concerning general political attitudes, 
government spending levels, and feeling thermometer measurements for liberalism, 
which should correlated highly with a pro-spending belief, were employed to measure 
general political attitudes.  Garand et al. find support for an attitudinally liberal stance by 
government employees.  They demonstrate that twenty-seven of thirty general political 
attitudes are in the expected direction, with fifteen significant, forty-three of the forty-
eight feeling thermometers are in the expected direction, with twenty significant; and 
twenty-eight of the thirty-four spending attitudes are in the expected direction, with 10 
significant. 
There is also strong evidence that government employees will participate and 
vote with greater regularity and greater number than other citizens (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone, 1980; and Garand et al., 1991; Sears and Citrin, 1982).  Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone find that government employees are much more likely to vote than the rest 
of the population, even after controlling for various demographic and environmental 
variables.  They find that 83 percent of government employees reported voting in 1972, 
as opposed to 65 percent of the general public.  The authors suggest that these 
differences may be the result of rational self-interested bureaucrats responding to their 
welfare with the appropriate voting behavior.  Sears and Citrin also find higher turnout 
rates by public sector employees for the tax revolt propositions, with public employee 
turnout at 51 percent and the remaining population at only 30 percent.  These 
differences remain consistent even after controlling for demographics and yield the 
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conclusion that bureaucratic opposition to the tax revolt measures stemmed from self-
interest and not social advantage. 
Also, based on an individual level analysis of turnout, Garand et al. (1991) also 
find strong empirical support for significantly higher turnout rates of government 
employees.  The authors examined the differences in the general, Presidential, 
Governor, Senate, and House elections between bureaucrats and the general public, as 
well as the independent effect of government employment on the probability to turn out.  
In each midterm election, differences always exceeded 10 percentage points, while in 
presidential election years the difference remained above 8 percent.  Further evidence is 
found in research by Blair (1993), which utilized the National Election Survey Data from 
1982 to 1990 to establish significant differences in the turnout rate for government 
employees after controlling for a wide range of individual and environmental 
characteristics.  Once again, the differences were much greater during the midterm 
election cycle. 
Finally, government employees are also more likely than other citizens to cast 
votes for Democratic candidates, though here again the differences are not glaring and 
vary from one election to the next (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1991; Garand, Parkhurst, and 
Seoud, 1991).  Blais, Blake and Dion (1991) find consistently higher support for parties 
of the left in western democracies.  Concerning the United States, they find significantly 
higher support for the Democratic Party in five of the seven presidential election years 
between 1960 and 1984, with significantly different support in 1984 and 1988.  
Furthermore, Garand et al. (1991) provide a direct measure of the hypothesized vote 
choice differences with an individual level analysis of the vote for President, House, 
Senate and gubernatorial candidate.  They find moderate support for the vote choice 
hypothesis of weaker support for the Republican Party.  The authors find less 
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Republican support in all elections, but more strongly in the 1982 and 1984 elections, 
while discovering less difference in the 1986 elections.   
The Bureau Voting Model: The Key to Motive and Opportunity 
 
From this previous research, it is evident that the bureau information monopoly and 
bureau voting models have strong similarities.  Both models assume that government 
employees are self-interested actors who seek to maximize, to the extent possible, agency 
budgets and/or the size of government.  Both models suggest that public-sector 
employees act in their own self interest, that they exercise some influence over elected 
public officials, and that the result is an increase in the size of the public sector.  Where 
these two models differ lies in the causal mechanism that presumably results in increases 
in the size of the public sector.  For the bureau information monopoly model, it is the ability 
of bureaucrats to profit from their information advantage over elected officials in 
institutional settings that results in the effect on government spending.  For the bureau 
voting model, it is the advantageous position of government employees in the electorate 
relative to that of other citizens that has the effect on government spending.   
 The bureau information monopoly model suggests that elected officials respond to 
information asymmetries that play themselves out primarily in the institutional settings that 
involve the interaction of the bureaucracy and Congress.  In its purest sense, the bureau 
information monopoly model would seem to leave very little room for government 
employees to persuade their legislators through elections and other aspects of the 
representative process.  For the bureau information monopoly model, dyadic modes of 
representation are largely irrelevant, insofar as there is no explicit linkage depicted 
between government employees who reside in a given House district and the behavior of 
their individual representatives.  Rather, bureaucratic influences are depicted as being 
much more diffuse and institutional, with the effects of information asymmetries being 
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manifested in congressional testimony, agency documents, committee hearings, agency 
budget requests, and oversight instead of in elections. 
 Conversely, the possibility of dyadic representation and electoral influence is an 
explicit part of the bureau voting model.  The leverage that public-sector employees have 
over members of Congress takes place outside of institutional settings, and involves the 
influence of individual government employees who reside in districts or states represented 
by specific House members or senators.  For the bureau voting model, control over 
elected officials occurs when government employees constitute a large enough proportion 
of a given constituency that they are able to provide relative electoral advantages to 
candidates who support their policy positions.  Moreover, if government employees 
constitute a substantial proportion of the electorate in given districts--either because 
government employees comprise a large proportion of the district population, or because 
public-sector bureaucrats are more likely to turn out on election day--then the legislators 
representing those districts may perceive the need to respond to the interests of 
government employees when casting roll-call votes. 
 For instance, legislators who regularly vote in favor of greater public-sector 
spending because they represents a district with a sizeable contingent of public-sector 
employees (who, presumably, support greater government spending) are not necessarily 
being influenced by an information monopoly that benefits bureaucrats; rather, these 
legislators are responding to standard electoral pressures to which they would respond 
under any circumstances.  In this case, the legislators respond as they would to any 
similarly-sized, high-turnout, knowledgeable group residing in their districts--that is, they 
support an enhanced public sector because they perceive a strong electoral presence 
from a group that can have significant influence on future election outcomes.  Given this, 
the observation of a relationship between the relative number of public-sector employees 
and legislators' roll-call behavior in favor of an enhanced governmental sector provides 
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independent evidence of processes that are consistent with those suggested by the 
bureau-voting model and would demonstrate the effect of government employees as an 
important sub-group within legislator’s constituencies. 
 By examining the linkages between congressional roll call voting and 
bureaucratic electoral influence, the potentiality of government employees as a core 
constituency for legislators can be established.  In addition, some clarity and refinement 
could be applied to the literature and theories of government growth.  Political 
persuasion that manifests itself in the growth of government would certainly enhance the 
support for the bureau voting model.  
SUMMARY 
 
 Could government employees be considered a core constituency by 
representatives?  An examination of the literature concerning elections, participation, 
and the political behavior of bureaucrats seems to indicate this possibility.  If candidates 
and parties are targeting mobilization toward subgroup they consider supportive within 
district constituencies, government employees seem to have the qualities that 
candidates could be interested in cultivating for their reelection constituencies or 
supporting coalitions.  Furthermore, the low turnout that exists in congressional midterm 
elections makes the identification and mobilization of supporting core constituencies 
even more of a potential impact on the reelection prospects of candidates. 
 The relationship between government employees and representatives is certainly 
a plausible theory.  The empirical findings from the bureau voting model, while 
equivocal, do support some ideological and political distinctions between government 
employees and other citizens.  The findings certainly support differences in political 
participation.  Government employees, as rational self-interested actors, do appear to 
desire increased, or at least maintained, levels of government spending and certainly 
participate at a higher rate than the remaining population.  It is also plausible that 
 43
politicians, who are interested in maintaining political and electoral support, will gravitate 
toward such participatory segments of the electorate as a constituency.  Therefore, if 
government employees are more supportive than other citizens of an expanded public 
sector, members of Congress should be particularly responsive to these high turnout 
voters when it comes time to cast roll-call votes on issues pertaining to the size of 
government.  If reelection is the ultimate outcome for politicians, they should be astute 
enough to modify their political behavior to garner the support of a group such as 




MODELING BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING 
 
 Do government employees constitute a core-constituency to legislators?  That is 
the central question to be addressed by this dissertation.  An examination of the literatures 
concerning legislative representation and bureaucratic voting behavior has hinted that the 
prerequisites for a relationship may exist between legislators and government employees.  
Legislators do appear to be generally responsive to their constituencies.  Furthermore, 
they are especially attuned to the core constituencies that they consider to be their 
reelection constituencies.  The literature concerned with the influence of bureaucrats on 
the growth of government has portrayed government employees as possessing many of 
the qualities that candidates desire in a supporting coalition.  They have a specific and 
understandable motivation to be engaged in the political system, and have demonstrated 
that they will participate at higher rates than the remaining electorate.   
 Despite the complementary nature of the findings between these two literatures 
with regards to legislative responsiveness and bureaucratic voting power, there has been 
no scholarly research has attempted to measure the potential influence of government 
employees on the behavioral responsiveness of legislators.  In this dissertation, I seek to 
explicitly examine this yet unmeasured relationship and discover its existence and 
influence. 
How do we examine the question of government employees as a core-
constituency to legislators?  First, I propose the hypothesis regarding the expectation of 
government employees as a core constituency.  Second, I suggest the proper 
specification of a model to measure this hypothesized core constituency effect and define 
explicitly the variables, data, and method to be utilized to estimate the level of 
responsiveness of legislators to bureaucratic influence. 
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 Evidence gathered from previous research seems to suggest that government 
employees have many of the requisite qualities that candidates would consider important 
in their search for core supporters in their reelection bids.  Government employees have 
more liberal views of the role of government, participate at significantly higher rates than 
the rest of the electorate, and are more likely to vote for more liberal parties.  From the 
literature on legislative representation, one can find evidence that there is a linkage 
between legislators and their constituencies.  While this linkage may be attenuated by 
other mitigating influences on the decision-making calculus of legislators, it remains clear 
that preferences of constituents play a significant role in the shaping those decisions.  
Election circumstances and personal characteristics may increase or decrease the weight 
placed on the preferences of constituents, but they remain an influence regardless of 
those other factors. 
 Previous research has also demonstrated the existence of certain core 
constituencies to legislators and their reelection efforts.  These reelection constituencies or 
supporting coalitions are counted upon to produce support during the election cycle and 
on election day.  Scholars have identified both demographic and political constituencies to 
which legislators appear to be more responsive than their larger general constituencies.  
Furthermore, current candidate-centered election dynamics and the concentrated and 
targeted mobilization efforts of candidates and parties indicate the potential for these core 
constituencies to be of great significance in elections. 
 Finally, the bureau voting model has suggested that government employees, 
acting as self-interested utility maximizers, will use their votes to promote their own well-
being and life satisfaction.  While bureaucrats have not shown drastic differences in 
political attitudes when compared to the remaining population, they have demonstrated 
very significant differences in participation rates and significantly more liberal vote choices.  
As a definable group with a high and consistent level of turnout, government employees 
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certainly appear to be a highly profitable core constituency for legislators seeking 
reelection.  Furthermore, government employees seem to have a vested interest in 
election outcomes.  As employees of the government, it certainly is plausible that they 
would seek oversight and decision-making from candidates more sympathetic to their 
cause.  While other voters may identify issues or ideological dispositions that influence 
their electoral behavior, government employees can be thought of as voting for their 
livelihood, or at least the desire to maximize the maintenance or enhancement of their 
status within the government.  They certainly would seem to have a much greater 
personal stake in election outcomes than most others in the population. 
It is my central hypothesis that government employees are indeed a reelection 
constituency or supporting coalition for legislators.  As such, legislators should exhibit 
increased levels of responsiveness to this constituency in their roll-call behavior in the 
same manner that other subgroups have experienced greater responsiveness than the 
general population.  How exactly this relationship manifests itself in relation to the other 
mediators on the legislator-constituency linkage is determined by the proper modeling of 
this relationship.  The central hypothesis can be explicitly offered as: 
H1: A negative relationship exists between conservative roll-call 
voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives 
on budgetary issues and increases in the level of government 
employment congressional districts 
 
MODELING BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATIVE 
ROLL-CALL BEHAVIOR 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the linkages between 
congressional roll-call voting and bureaucratic influence.  The level of analysis is the 
House of Representatives.  The House of Representatives provides an excellent source to 
examine the hypothesized linkage.  Because of the constitutional requirement that House 
districts have equal population, the association between changes in proportion of 
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government employees and the roll-call behavior of representatives across these districts 
can be measured with great certainty.  
So how do we proceed to examine such a relationship between roll-call behavior of 
elected officials and government employees?  Explicitly for this dissertation, how best 
should we proceed to explore the predicted impact of public-sector employees on the roll-
call behavior of U.S. House members?  Ideally, information would be collected for each 
district on the policy and ideological views of government employees and those of other 
citizens, and then use this data to evaluate the linkage between the views of these two 
sets of constituents, on one hand, and the roll-call behavior of House members, on the 
other.  Unfortunately, data on the policy preferences of House constituencies are difficult 
to obtain, and it is difficult to contemplate even the remote possibility of obtaining policy 
preference data for occupational subgroups within these districts.   
 Despite this design difficulty, the potential significance of the hypothesized 
relationship suggests that an alternative approach be identified.  One such alternative 
approach is to assume that the policy preferences of government employees differ from 
those of other citizens, and to explore how the proportion of government employees in 
House districts is related to patterns of roll-call behavior among House members.  This 
assumption has validity given what we know concerning the empirical findings that 
government employees do appear to hold differing policy views when compared to the 
remaining population.  Therefore, if it is discovered that House members representing 
districts with sizeable numbers of public-sector employees exhibit greater roll-call support 
for enhanced government spending than House members representing districts with small 
numbers of public-sector employees, one could infer that House members are being 
responsive to the interests of government employees in a manner that is consistent with 
both the representational literature and the bureau voting model. 
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 For this dissertation, I develop and test empirically several models that permit the 
exploration of the effects of the number of government employees in each congressional 
district on patterns of roll-call voting by House members on votes pertaining to government 
spending.  This relationship is evaluated in a multivariate model that permits one to control 
for the effects of a range of individual-level, state-level, and district-level variables thought 
to be related to roll-call support for government spending and representational 
responsiveness.  To this end, the data and model to be utilized are discussed below. 
The Dependent Variable 
 
 Because the focus of this dissertation is on roll-call support for greater 
governmental spending among House members, it is necessary to have a dependent 
variable that represents the tendency of House members to support or oppose increases 
in the size of the public sector.  Several approaches are available to measure this concept.  
One could rely on data representing the positions taken by House members on individual 
roll-calls that relate to increases in spending and/or taxes.  Alternatively, many of the roll-
call indices produced by various interest organizations reflect an underlying liberal-
conservative policy dimension; insofar as the ideological orientation of legislators 
represents their views toward the size of the public sector, roll-call indices such as those 
associated with the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) or the American Conservative 
Union (ACU) could be adequate proxies for pro- or anti-spending behavior, and should 
generally be appropriate for studying support for or opposition to increased government 
spending.  
 For this dissertation, I adopt a third alternative.  Like Payne (1991), I rely on the 
roll-call indices created by the non-partisan National Taxpayers Union (NTU).  This NTU 
score is a measure of the roll-call behavior of House members on spending measures 
before the U.S. House of Representatives.  This spending score is the most 
comprehensive rating of the roll call behavior of individual members of Congress 
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concerning votes pertaining to budgetary matters and fits the specific type of 
responsiveness I expect to model between legislators and government employees.  The 
NTU measure is scaled so that a higher score indicates members' greater fiscal 
conservatism--i.e., opposition to greater spending and/or support for reductions in federal 
spending,  and has a score range between zero and 100.   The NTU score should provide 
a sound measure of the strength of support for reducing spending by members of the 
House of Representatives.  
 The National Taxpayer’s Union analyses every roll-call vote taken during each 
congress and selects those votes that affect the amount of money spent by the federal 
government.  Each vote is assigned a rating from zero to 100 in order to properly weight 
each vote’s effect on the federal budget.  NTU scores are then computed by dividing the 
total of votes cast against higher spending by the total number of spending issues on 
which the member voted.  The number of votes included for each congress varies from a 
low of 369 to a high of 508.  The inclusion of such a comprehensive number of votes on 
budgetary issues and the weighting of such votes provides an unbiased estimation of 
congressional spending attitudes.  Furthermore, the weighting of each vote is done by the 
NTU and two Federal budget experts, which is intended to reduce any bias in the 
weighting of those votes. 
 While this subset of roll-call votes just pertains to votes concerned with the impact 
on the federal budget, the NTU scores do correlate highly with each representative’s rating 
from the ADA and with Poole and Rosenthal’s roll-call ideology measure (-.789 and .856 
respectively).  This high correlation indicates that NTU scores are not a biased subset of 
roll-call votes by representatives, but instead are a subset of the more general ideological 
disposition of each representative.  Because of these highly significant correlations, any 
relationship to be discovered between representatives and government employees would 
be similar if any of these measures of representative roll-call voting were utilized.  Despite 
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this fact, I argue that the use of the NTU roll-call scoring captures the true responsiveness 
to be found toward the subgroup of government employees.  The correlations are high 
with these other measures of representative roll-call voting, but they are not perfect.  
Therefore, the NTU score does appear to be capturing something unique in the roll-call 
voting of representatives.  For this reason, I will utilize the mean spending score given to 
each representative by the NTU during each Congressional session from 1982 to 1998.  
The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of this variable is provided 
Appendix B. 
Independent Variable:  Government Employment  
  
 The critical independent variable to this analysis is the measure of the relative 
strength of public-sector employees in each congressional district.  This variable is 
measured as the number of government employees as a proportion of the total voting-age 
population residing in each congressional district.   Since the dependent variable is 
measured in the direction of conservatism toward increased government spending, it is 
hypothesized that the coefficient for this variable will be negative, suggesting a negative 
relationship between district government employment and NTU scores. 
 Voting-age population is utilized as the denominator because the resulting 
percentage more closely approximates the relative voting strength available to a candidate 
when calculating decisions on roll-call votes.  The variation in the number of government 
employees in each congressional district varies from 4.2% to 27.6%.  This proportion of 
government employees in each congressional district for the 1980s and 1990s is indicated 
in Appendix B. 
A distinction will also be made between federal, state, and local government 
employees.   The ranges of these subgroups are .59% to 18.04% for federal employees, 
.60% to 11.68% for state government employees, and 1.74% to 10.20% for local 
government employees.  All government employees may not be the same.  While it is 
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probable that they share many similar interests, it is also the case that there are some 
areas in which the interests of public-sector employees will differ depending on whether 
they work for the federal, state, or local level of government.  At all levels of the 
bureaucracy, the motivation to support increased spending by the federal government 
should be in operation.  It is the strength of this motivation that may differ between the 
groups.  Because federal employees are directly affected by the spending decisions 
made by the federal government, the strength of the hypothesized relationship is most 
likely to function the strongest with this sector of pubic employees.  The relationship 
should still exist for state and local government employees, as they are also affected by 
federal spending decisions, but less directly.  Because federal spending decisions do 
affect intergovernmental funding levels, state and local bureaucrats may be somewhat 
less responsive to the spending behavior of representatives. Fortunately, the U.S. 
Census, from which the government employee data is obtained, reports public-sector 
employment broken down by level of government.  Given this, several alternative 
versions of the linkage models are estimated to include separate variables for federal, 
state, and local government employment.  I have hypothesized that each 
representative’s NTU score will decrease as the level of government employment in their 
district increases.  This relationship should be consistent for all levels of government 
employment, but perhaps stronger for federal employees due to the direct effect of 
federal spending decisions on their life satisfaction. 
Other Independent Variables: Legislator and Constituency Characteristics 
  
 In order to estimate the hypothesized effect of government employees on the roll-
call behavior of members of Congress, it is of paramount importance to properly specify 
my statistical model.  By including additional variables into the model, I am building a 
comprehensive model explaining the variance in NTU scores and controlling for the effects 
of the other independent variables.  This control allows an unbiased estimate of the effect 
 52
of government employees on representative’s NTU scores.  A review of the literature has 
given several suggestions for inclusion in our model.  These suggestions can be classified 
into two broad categories: (1) Constituency Characteristics and (2) Legislator 
Characteristics.  By including the political and social-demographic constituency contextual 
information for each congressional district, it is possible to identify the true effect that 
variation in government employment across districts has on roll-call voting behavior.  This 
same rationale applies for legislator characteristics.  The inclusion of the personal 
characteristics and electoral circumstances of representatives helps estimate the relative 
impact of changes in government employment on those representative’s decision-making 
calculus.  Once these environmental and individual characteristics are included in the 
model, the true nature of our hypothesized relationship can be realized. 
Party Identification and Ideology 
 
 Considering the significant ideological differences between the Democratic and 
Republican parties in Congress, I include each representative’s party identification in the 
model of congressional responsiveness to roll-call spending votes.  The reason for 
including party identification in my model is to control for the organizational influence that 
party has on representative’s roll-call voting (Pool and Rosenthal, 1997; Kingdon, 1989).  
These organizational effects are independent of the effect of constituent preferences.  
The party leadership and other partisan members of the House of Representatives have 
an affect on the roll-call voting of representatives.  To the extent that party organizes the 
decision-making process of individual members, it will have an influence on the roll-call 
behavior concerning budgetary policy.  The coefficient for party identification is expected 
to be positive, as it a dichotomous measure with Republicans coded as a “1” and 
Democrats coded as a “0”.  Therefore, I hypothesize that Republican members of 
congress are more conservative than Democratic members in their roll-call behavior and 
are less supportive on increases in the federal budget.   
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 I also include each members rating by the Americans for Democratic Action as a 
measure of the ideological roll-call behavior of representatives.  Although there is a 
strong correlation between NTU scores and ADA scores, I believe that these are both 
subsets are the total roll-call voting history of each representative and that the ADA 
score is a good indicator of general ideology, while NTU scores are specific to the 
budgetary allocation of government.  While Pool and Rosenthal have aptly demonstrated 
the historical continuity of roll-call behavior of legislators, I contend that these two 
measures are highlighting different aspects of each representative’s voting record.  
Furthermore, inclusion of the ADA scores is important to capture the general ideological 
predispositions of each member.  Therefore, I hypothesize that increases in the each 
representative’s ADA score will have a negative effect on each member’s NTU score. 
Congressional Seniority 
 
Congressional seniority is measured as the numbers of year’s a member has 
continuously served in the House of Representatives.  There are two different 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between member seniority and congressional 
responsiveness in the literature.  First, Sullivan and Uslaner (1978) have found that the 
advantages of incumbency allow more senior representatives to ignore the preferences 
of constituents, with these more senior members achieved reelection almost 80% of the 
time even when challengers more accurately represented the simulated districts issue 
opinions.  Second, Glazer and Robbins (1985) argue that more experienced 
representatives are better equipped to both acknowledge and adjust to constituency 
preferences.  Their results indicate that those members that were more responsive to 
their constituency change had higher reelection rates.  Therefore, there are two different 
expectations for seniority:  (1) relationship between constituent preferences and 
congressional voting behavior will decline as congressional seniority increases and (2) 
the relationship between constituent preferences and congressional voting behavior will 
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increase as congressional seniority increases.  Research by Payne (1991) suggests the 
direction seniority should take concerning issues of government spending.  He illustrates 
that more senior legislators are more likely to support increased government spending.  
Payne demonstrates that as representatives increase their seniority in the congress, 
they become captured by the institutions they serve by a process of persuasion.  He 
describes the situations whereby representatives are surrounded by a “culture of 
spending” which, over time, persuades that representative that government spending is 
needed.  Therefore, I hypothesize that seniority should have a negative influence on the 
NTU scores of representatives. 
State Ideology and District Ideology 
  
 Previous research has indicated the strong influence of constituency opinion on 
legislative roll-call voting decisions (Kingdon, 1989; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; Wright, 
1989; Overby and Cosgrove, 1996).   Therefore, I utilize several measures to capture the 
disposition of each representative’s constituency.  The best source to measure district 
constituency preferences or opinion would be from survey level data for each 
congressional district.  Such measures would directly capture the opinions and 
preferences of those constituencies and provide an excellent source of the true 
preferences for each congressional district.  Unfortunately, there exists no such explicit 
large scale sample of each district’s constituency preferences.  The collection of 435 large 
scale survey samples of constituent preferences during each election cycle has proved to 
be too difficult an endeavor for social science to attempt.  Consequently, the 
measurement of constituency ideology has been a major concern scholars interested in 
studying constituency effects on legislative responsiveness.   
 Previous research has made various attempts to find alternatives to direct survey 
data by congressional district.  This research has produced several alternative measures 
that are available for use as surrogates for a true measure of constituency preference.   
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Scholars have used demographic variables (such as income, industry, education, 
urbanization, racial composition), small-sample estimates of public opinion (Miller and 
Stokes, 1963), presidential and election results (LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997), 
simulated opinion based on the extension of estimates from individual-level models to 
the aggregate district level (Erikson, 1978), and referenda voting (McCrone and 
Kuklinski, 1979).  Unfortunately, these alternative measures of constituency opinion 
have all proven to be significantly less satisfying than what one would obtain if large-
sample estimates of opinion were available across all districts. 
State Level Constituency Ideology   
  
 The first two measures of constituency preference are borrowed from the work of 
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993).  The authors have developed statewide measures of 
constituency characteristics that can be used to approximate constituency preferences.  
These statewide constituency preference measures are: (1) state partisanship and (2) 
state ideology.  While not at the district level of analysis, these measures can provide 
some contextual control for the mass ideology and partisanship environment of 
representatives.  The partisanship and ideology at the state level have importance for 
several reasons.  Representatives and their districts do not exist in a vacuum.  
Representatives may be tempered in their responsiveness to their district constituencies 
by the larger political context of their respective state.  While certainly of a secondary 
nature, the state political context can give a representative insight into the trends and 
demographics of the state at large, especially when their district is not representative of 
the remaining state.  Politicians are aware of their surroundings, making the larger political 
context potentially important to all representatives, especially those that may desire 
eventual senatorial or gubernatorial positions.  Representatives are also called upon to 
make decisions that impact beyond their own district.  It is not unreasonable to expect 
members to need and desire perspective on the larger political context of their state when 
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making decisions that will impact the state.  Finally, representatives often look toward their 
fellow membership when deciding how to proceed on public policy (Kingdon, 1989).  To 
the extent they look to members of their state delegation for guidance, the inclusion of 
state partisanship and ideology will help to capture that influence. 
 Erikson, Wright, and McIver utilized data from the CBS News / New York Times 
surveys to create large-sample estimates of state liberalism and partisanship for the period 
of 1976-1992.  These estimates were done by aggregating respondents across surveys to 
create samples for each state that are sufficiently large to permit reasonable estimates of 
state political characteristics.  Erikson et al. utilize respondents' partisan and ideological 
self-reports to create measures of mass partisanship and mass ideological conservatism 
for each state.   These state-level contextual variables are utilized to capture the general 
political environment of each representative’s state.  While other district-level measures 
are utilized, the statewide context still has validity for determining the general political 
disposition of the state from which each district is drawn. 
 Because these variables are measured in the liberal direction, it is hypothesized 
that each will have a negative effect on the dependent variable.  Accordingly, it is 
suggested that more conservative state environmental conditions should lead to stronger 
inclinations on the part of House members to reduce government spending. 
District Level Constituency Preferences  
 
 There are several different avenues taken by scholars in the attempt to simulate 
true district constituency opinion or preference.  These different approaches include the 
use of demographic variables, referenda voting, and simulation of district preferences.  
Each of these alternatives has merit, but each also has deficiencies that make them less 
than ideal.    
 The use of demographic measures to estimate constituency preferences involves 
estimating a model in which legislative roll-call behavior is depicted as a function of a 
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wide range of district demographic characteristics obtained from the U.S. Census 
(Erikson, 1978; Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 
1984; Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996).  This type of measurement does have merit.  
Both Fenno (1978) and Kingdon (1989) have demonstrated that members of the U.S. 
House think about their geographic constituencies in terms of a number of attributes, 
including demographic characteristics.  There is difficulty with demographics as a 
surrogate for constituency preferences because these individual demographic 
characteristics must be interpretable at a higher level of aggregation.  The assumption 
that the individual level demographic processes at work are interpretable in the same 
manner as aggregate relationships between demographic characteristics and aggregate 
policy preferences can be problematic due to issues related to ecological fallacy.  
 Another type of surrogate for constituency ideology that involves demographic 
variables is simulated district opinion.  This measure is designed to take advantage of 
demographic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge 
concerning the relationship between individuals' demographic characteristics and their 
policy positions.  In this type of simulation, data from a lower level of aggregation, such 
as individual-level surveys, are used to simulate opinion at a higher level of aggregation, 
such as the district (Erikson 1978).  Simulated measures of opinion have been found to 
have a stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures based on small-
sample estimates (Erikson 1978).  The most important concern with this approach is that 
the individual-level regressions upon which the simulations are based often exhibit 
relatively low levels of fit to the data.  With adjusted R-square levels often below 0.10, 
measures of simulated district-level opinion have a significantly large amount of random 
error associated with them, which suggests that while these measures are an 
improvement over those obtained from other analytical approaches, they remain 
somewhat imprecise indicators of constituency opinion. 
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 Scholars have also suggested presidential election results as a surrogate 
measure of district ideological orientation (Johannes, 1984; Glazer and Robbins, 1985; 
LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997).  The problem with this approach is that not all 
presidential elections are equally ideological in nature, which gives this measure a lack 
of reliability.  While certain presidential elections may be highly ideological and therefore 
reflect the ideological characteristics of constituencies, some elections are much less 
ideological.  LeoGrande and Jeydel’s (1997) exploration of the possibility of utilizing 
presidential election results as a surrogate for district ideology found only moderate 
correlations for presidential election results between adjacent elections, suggesting that 
the reliability of the aggregate presidential vote is not extremely high.  Therefore, the use 
of the presidential vote is not consistent with long-term effects implied by constituency 
ideological orientations. 
 Referendum data has also been utilized as a surrogate for true constituency 
preferences.  Referendum elections allow voters to explicitly express an opinion on the 
policy put to the vote and allow scholars to utilize district-level data on referenda election 
results to estimate the policy preferences of those constituencies.  The use of referenda 
data as a surrogate measure of constituency policy preferences is best represented by 
the work of McCrone and Kuklinski (1979).  They use data from California referenda to 
estimate the positions of district constituencies on three dimensions that emerge from a 
factor analysis of the referenda data.  While these scholars find that referenda data can 
provide quite reliable measures of district ideology, this type of data is only available at 
uneven times in a limited number of states, which makes their use in comprehensive roll-
call studies problematic. 
 For this dissertation, I utilize a measure of district constituency ideology 
developed by Ardoin and Garand (2003).  This measure is a simulation of district 
ideology, but differs from previous simulations.  Their measure makes the best use of 
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the data available for all congressional districts and does not have the defects of other 
measures of district constituency preferences.  Ardoin and Garand have developed a 
more reliable and useful measure of district opinion by employing an alternative 
approach to simulating constituency ideology.  Specifically, they adopt a "top-down" 
simulation approach, which involves using data from a higher level of aggregation (i.e., 
the American states) to simulate opinion at a lower level of aggregation (i.e., 
congressional districts).  First, they use state-level data to estimate the relationship 
between state ideology, as measured by Erikson, Wright and McIver(1993), and various 
demographic and political variables.  Once the estimates of the parameters of the model 
of state ideology are obtained, data from U.S. House districts are substituted into the 
model to yield predicted levels of opinion liberalism for House districts.   
The resulting predicted values represent the estimated ideological orientation of 
each U.S. House district, based on (1) the observed relationship between these 
variables and state ideology, and (2) the values of these variables for each U.S. House 
district.  The results provide estimates of House district ideology that reflect the observed 
relationships between constituent ideology and various independent variables at the 
state level, as well as the values on these independent variables in U.S. House districts.  
This alternative measure seems to most closely approach the true district preferences, 
and is the choice among the alternatives for inclusion in this model of legislative 
responsiveness.  This measure of district ideology in coded in a liberal direction, it is 
hypothesized that this variable will have a negative impact on the dependent variable. 
Other Control Variables 
 
 Several other district level measures are be incorporated into the model to capture 
the district constituency characteristics that are though to mediate the responsiveness 
relationship between representatives and their constituencies.  Specifically, these district-
level control variables are introduced into the model to represent the remaining district 
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characteristics that are expected to influence the level of legislative responsiveness to 
constituencies in general and also predicted to affect the propensity of House members to 
support or oppose greater public-sector spending.  As such, these variables permit us to 
control for any intervening effects for the relationship between government employees and 
each member's spending scores.  The following measures are included in the analysis:  
(1) district median family income, (2) district outlays by the federal government; (3) district 
urbanization; and (4) district racial composition. 
Median Family Income and Urbanization 
  
 There are several measures available that can serve to test alternative 
explanations for representative’s roll-call behavior on government spending policy.  There 
are many competing explanations beyond those theories tied to bureaucratic information 
monopoly or bureau voting model effects that attempt to explain the growth of government 
(Borcherding, 1977b; Goetz, 1977; Lowery and Berry, 1983; Garand, 1988; Cameron, 
1978).  Most of the alternative explanations of government growth, such as fiscal illusion, 
international economic interdependence, or supply-side revenue collection are not 
amenable to the examination of the variation in individual representative’s roll-call voting 
behavior on spending policy.  These explanations are concerned with either the nation or 
state as the level of analysis and seek to explain changes in growth in the size of 
government over several decades.  Since there is no appreciable variability across 
congressional districts for most of the measures associated with these theories, they 
cannot be included in this type of analysis.  Despite this lack of compatibility, there are 
several measures that can be included in an attempt to provide an improvement in the 
specification of the model.  The inclusion of these measures of alternative explanations of 
government growth will provide enhanced support for the bureau voting model should the 
expected effect be found.  By controlling for other factors which may be affecting the 
decision-making calculus of representatives on budgetary spending votes, any 
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explanatory value remaining as a function of variability in the proportion of government 
employees that reside in a district will lend confirmatory evidence for the bureau voting 
model. 
   Income and urbanization are incorporated into the model to represent the 
explanation of government growth associated with Wagner’s Law (Wagner, 1877; Lowery 
and Berry, 1983; Borcherding, 1977).  This theory suggests that increases in the spending 
by government are in response to changes in the socio-economic environment of the 
nation.  It argues that the process of industrialization lead to an increase in the expansion 
of the public sector in several ways.  First, it is argued that increasing economic affluence 
in society leads to the demand for increases in government expenditures.  While scholars 
have argued over the validity of Wagner’s assertion that the elasticity of public 
expenditures is greater than one, it remains valid to contend that increases in public 
income should lead to some increase in public demand for increases in government 
services.  As society becomes more affluent, individual have the propensity to seek 
increases in quality of life rather than simple subsistence.  This ability to diversify demand 
or desires could certainly create increases in demands on the public sector concerning 
issues such as transportation, law enforcement, recreation or entertainment.  A second 
closely related factor associated with this theory is interdependence.  Borcherding explains 
that “as the economy develops and its population becomes larger, more densely settled, 
and more urbanized, types of interdependence develop that are not well handled by 
private markets” (Borcherding, 1977b, pg. 52).  It is not difficult to imagine that increases in 
urbanization have led to the government becoming more involved in policy areas such as 
transportation, healthcare, and social support.   
 The inclusion of measures of urbanization and median income for each 
congressional district will serve as indicators of these hypothesized effects of Wagner’s 
Law.  If there are Wagner’s Law effects, they should be associated with increasing 
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urbanization and median income in congressional districts.  As those districts become 
more urbanized, the interdependence of the population should lead to increased demand 
for government spending in those districts.  Also, increasing levels of income should result 
in increased demand for government spending to enhance the quality of life in those 
districts.  If House members are attentive to the demands of there constituents, and the 
Wagner’s Law explanation for increases in government expenditures has validity, it is 
hypothesized that increases in urbanization and increases in district wealth will lead to 
increases representative’s NTU scores. 
District Budgetary Outlays   
 
 The amount of federal budgetary outlays to each congressional district is included 
as a control on the roll-call behavior of representatives on spending votes.  It seems 
plausible that representatives will seek to maintain and protect the spending levels 
associated with their districts (Stein and Bickers, 1994).  Insofar as these outlays to 
districts are helpful to constituents and allow for the claiming of credit for their procurement 
and continuance, the desire to maintain levels of spending can be well understood.  Stein 
and Bickers (1994) find that awareness of new projects in a congressional district 
increases the vote for the incumbent by almost 10 percent and that as the proportion of 
new outlays in a district increases, the vote for the incumbent also increases.  These 
findings certainly suggest that representatives may be sympathetic to increases in federal 
spending.  This sympathy may lead to representatives with large amounts of federal 
spending in their districts to be more supportive of federal spending to maintain this flow of 
spending to their districts.  Also, the inclusion of this control measure will clarify the 
relationship between district outlays and district government employment.  Any correlation 
between government employment and House member roll-call voting behavior may 
actually be a spurious relationship.  It could simply be the funding of government, with the 
attendant employment of government workers, that is explaining ay relationship, not the 
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attractiveness of bureaucrats as a core constituency.  By including district outlays, I can 
therefore help to discern the true nature of the relationship between House member roll-
call behavior and government employment.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that as outlays 




 The proportion of African-Americans in a congressional district is included to serve 
as a control on proportion of government employees as subgroup and to control for 
demands that African-Americans make for goods and services in society.  Previous 
literature has indicated that changes in racial composition can affect the voting behavior of 
legislators, especially those representatives of the Democratic Party (Overby and 
Cosgrove, 1996; Leveaux and Garand, 2003).  Because some proportion of government 
employees are African-American, this group is included to confirm that any influence that 
government employees have on the voting behavior of legislators is not merely the close 
association between the Democratic Party and African-Americans.  Furthermore, African-
Americans have several demographic characteristics that suggest that they may make 
greater demands on the social structure than others.  Government statistics indicate that 
African-Americans have lower educational attainment rates, lower median incomes, and 
higher proportions of individuals without adequate healthcare.  African-Americans, in 
general, make greater demands of the government than other identifiable groups.  Insofar 
as House members are attentive to their constituencies, the model hypothesizes that 
increases in the proportion of African-Americans in congressional districts will have a 
negative effect on NTU scores.  With all of the measures specified, the model to be testing 




NTU Score  =  a - b1 (Government Employment) - b2 (State Partisanship) –  
   b3 (State Partisanship) – b4 (District Ideology) –  
   b5 (Median Income) – b6 (District Urbanization) –  
   b7 (Racial Composition) – b8 (District Outlays) + 
   b9 (Representative Party) – b10 (Representative ADA) – b11 (Seniority) 
METHODOLOGY 
  
 As indicated above, a comprehensive model is developed in the effort to accurately 
capture and explain the linkage between bureaucratic influence and roll-call spending 
behavior.  Specifically, I employ cross-sectional analysis of each Congress from 1982 
through 1996 and also pool these Congresses into a single pooled cross-sectional model 
to capture any idiosyncratic effects and form more generalizable conclusions as to the 
predicted effects.  The pooled, cross-sectional analysis allows for the introduction of time 
into the analysis, thereby providing an accounting of the continuity and robustness of the 
expected effects.  As noted, the data used in this dissertation are collected for each 
House member serving in Congress from 1982 to 1996.  My unit of analysis is each 
member of House of Representatives, with data collected for each ith member in each 
tth Congress over the course of the time period under study. 
 For the cross-sectional analysis, I utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
This type of analysis is typical for estimating influences on a dependent continuous 
measure such as NTU scores.  Examination or the relationship between the dependent 
variable, representative’s NTU scores, and the independent variable of interest, the 
proportion of government employees in each congressional district, reveals the 
existence of heteroscedasticity.  The scatterplot of the relationship between the two 
measures is available in Appendix A.  The nature of this relationship suggests the 
violation of the regression assumption that the variance in the error term for each case is 
constant.  If this variance is inconsistent or biased as the value of a variable increases or 
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decreases, the significance tests associated with OLS regression can become unreliable 
because of distortion in OLS standard errors.  As such, it is necessary to correct for this 
heteroscedasticity to avoid the misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the findings of 
the tested models.  Therefore, I incorporate White’s Standard Error correction into the 
cross-sectional models to correct for any bias associated with the dependent variable of 
interest (White, 1980; Long and Ervin, 1999). 
 Furthermore, the pooled cross-sectional model utilized also may present some 
problems for model estimation.  Although ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is 
typically used in analyses of legislative representation, the pooling of data over several 
congresses necessitates the use of alternative estimation procedures.  First, because 
member cases are not independent over time, one might expect serial dependence in 
the data, also referred to as the problem of autocorrelated errors or autocorrelation.  This 
means that the error terms for individual senators at time t are likely to be correlated with 
the error terms for subsequent time periods.  Second, unequal variance across cross-
sections or time, another form of heteroscedasticity, is inherent in pooled data.  For 
pooled data, the differential variance in the error term is likely to affect whole sets of data 
and could be of greater harm to the validity of the results of the models estimated.  While 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity do not necessarily bias OLS estimates, they can 
make the usual tests of significance invalid and produce potentially misleading 
conclusions about the statistical significance of estimated regression coefficients.   
 In order to correct this problem, I utilize the generalized estimating equation 
(GEE) approach described by Zeger and Liang (1986).  The GEE approach is an 
extension of the generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects estimator, and is 
appropriate when the number of cross-sections (i.e., House members and senators) is 
larger than the number of time points.  This model can also be used with unbalanced 
data--that is, data in which the number of data points for each cross-section are unequal.  
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Most importantly, this procedure yields parameter estimates that are uncontaminated by 
the effects of autocorrelated and heteroscedastic errors. 
 I have also examined the model to be measured for the incidence of 
multicollinearity.  One of the assumptions of linear regression is the absence of perfect 
multicollinearity, meaning that none of the independent variables are perfectly correlated 
with another independent variable.  The presence of this problem can create estimation 
difficulties because it will produce large variances in slope estimation and hence large 
standard errors.  Therefore, multicollinearity will bias significant testing.  Fortunately, 
there are statistical tests available to identify the presence of multicollinearity.  For the 
models to be examined in this dissertation, I produced the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
to identify the existence of such an effect.  Fortunately, the results indicated no severe 
multicollinearity.  While the independent variables measuring each representative’s 
ideology and party identification were correlated, the VIF measures were relatively low.  
Furthermore, these two variables measure distinctly different theoretical concepts, 
making there inclusion necessary.  Ultimately, the testing for multicollinearity suggested 






 In this dissertation, I hypothesize that government employees have influence on 
the roll-call voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives.  The basis for 
this hypothesis is the empirically verified voting behavior and theoretically consistent 
motivation for that voting behavior.  I suggest that government employees, acting as self-
interested actors, seek to support candidates that are more supportive of their desire to 
increases or maintain the level of federal government spending.  Evidence of this 
candidate support and candidate’s perception of this potential support should manifest 
itself in variation in the roll-call voting on government spending by members of the House 
of Representatives.  With the supporting literature identified and the modeling of this 
relationship described, I am left finally to answer the questions: Do government employees 
constitute a supporting coalition or a reelection core constituency to members of the 
House of Representatives? Does government employment affect the roll-call voting 
behavior of House members? 
BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: BASELINE MODELS 
   
 As we will see, the answer is yes.  Based upon the empirical results reported 
below, there does appear to be a linkage between bureaucrats and their representatives.  
The relationship between government employees and representative’s roll-call voting on 
spending measures is strong and consistent.  In Table 5.1, I report the results of the core 
analysis of the relationship between the proportion of government employees residing in 
each House member’s district and that House member’s NTU score controlling for the 
effects of other variables.  This model uses pooled data from congressional sessions 
from 1983 to 1996 to demonstrate the strength of this relationship.  First, the core model 
fits the data closely, explaining a significant portion of the variance in NTU scores for 
House members, as represented by the Pseudo-R2 of .7847.  Secondly, all of the 
 b Z Score
District Gov't Employ % (-) -27.2035 -2.523***
Party ID (+) 16.8769 12.501***
ADA Score (-) -0.2449 -13.241***
Seniority (-) -0.2777 -6.862***
State PID (-) -0.1028 -3.058***
State Ideology (-) -0.1380 -2.421***
District Ideology (-) -0.2201 -8.493***
District Urbanization (-) -0.0321 -1.837** 
District Median Income % (-) 0.0001 1.349*  
District Black % (-)  -0.1260 -4.662***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0003 -1.955** 
99th Congress 3.9332 11.126***
100th Congress -3.1835 -7.56***
101st Congress 2.3403 4.884***
102nd Congress 4.7850 9.162***
103rd Congress 6.4998 5.858***
104th Congress 15.0534 14.08***
Constant 51.0056 20.313***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7847
Number of obs      =      2942
Number of groups   =       764
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       3.9
max                =        15
Wald chi2(17)      =   8333.48
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Table 5.1
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Baseline Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model
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coefficients in the model are statistically significant and in the correct direction except 
one, the median income in each congressional district.  Thirdly, and most importantly, 
the measure of the proportion of government employees in each congressional district is 
found to have a strong and significant negative relationship on the spending 
conservatism of House members. 
The finding that government employees have a significant measurable effect on 
the roll-call voting behavior of House members is the central finding of this dissertation.  
From the core model (Table 5.1), it is clear that bureaucrats are having an impact on 
legislative decision-making on roll-call votes pertaining to spending policy.  Even after 
controlling for other possible influences on the roll-call vote spending decisions of House 
members, the relationship remains strong.  Table 5.1 indicates that after controlling for 
other effects, a 10% change in the number of government employees in a congressional 
district results in a 2.7 point decline in a House member’s NTU spending score.  Since the 
range of this independent variable is 23.4% (from a low of 4.2% to a high of 27.6%), the 
predicted difference in NTU scores for the two extremes is approximately 6.3 points.  
Bureaucrats do appear have an independent impact on the budgetary roll-call voting 
behavior of House members.   
It is also worth noting the effect of the additional independent variables included in 
the baseline model.  By controlling for the variety of other factors that may contribute to the 
roll-call voting decisions of House members, the value of the discovery that government 
employees have a discernable influence on that roll-call voting is greatly enhanced.  The 
control variables included in the model are repeatedly found to have effect  on the roll-call 
voting behavior of legislators in other scholarly research.  By confirming the impact of 
these other measures in this dissertation, I accomplish two things.  First, these other 
factors are found to have significant explanatory value in their own right.  This finding lends 
support to the specification of the models tested.  Secondly, the explanatory power of 
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these control measures neither marginalizes the influence of the central independent 
variable nor the hypothesis tested in this dissertation.  If government employees are found 
to have an independent effect on roll-call fiscal conservatism, even after controlling for the 
variety of factors included in the model, the validity of this finding is certainly strengthened. 
The independent variables representing legislator characteristics are all found to 
be significant and in the correct direction.  As Table 5.1 indicates, House member’s 
partisanship and ideology each have an independent influence on roll-call voting on 
government spending policy.  Holding the effects of all other variables constant, 
Republican House member’s NTU scores are 16.8 points higher than those of Democratic 
House members.  This difference is due to the conservative nature of the NTU score.  
That Republicans are on average more fiscally conservative in their voting for government 
spending items is confirmed.  Furthermore, House members’ ideology is also influential in 
their roll-call vote decisions.  The core model indicates that the higher the rating by the 
Americans for Democratic Action for House members, the less fiscally conservative is their 
voting on spending measures.  The results demonstrate that the NTU spending score of a 
House member declines by approximately one point for every four points of increase in the 
ADA score for that member.  The results for both individual partisanship and individual 
ideology are found to have the expected effect on roll-call spending decisions, as more 
conservative House members, both politically and ideologically, are more supportive of 
fiscal conservatism in government spending. 
The seniority of House members is also found to have a significant impact on the 
roll-call voting of those House members.  The results in Table 5.1 demonstrate that as a 
House member gains more seniority with Congress, they become less fiscally 
conservative in their voting behavior.  The results indicate that the NTU spending score for 
House member will decline by approximately one point for every four years of seniority 
gained in the Congress.  This finding mirrors the research of Payne (1991), who suggests 
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that legislators are effected by the institutional and political actors associated with the 
federal government.  This influence leads to the persuasion that government spending is 
needed and desired to accomplish the needs of the country, and therefore ultimately leads 
to less fiscal restraint by more senior members in the Congress.  More seasoned House 
members do appear to become socialized into supporting higher levels of governmental 
spending.  This finding lends additional support to the debate over the effect of seniority on 
representatives roll-call voting.  At least where fiscal matters are concerned, seniority does 
seem to produce different effects.   
The model also demonstrates strong empirical support for the influence of 
constituencies on the roll-call decision making of legislators.  The three measures of 
general constituency (state partisanship, state ideology and district ideology) are all 
significant and negatively related to House member’s fiscal conservatism in roll-call voting.  
The negative coefficients for state partisanship and state ideology confirm the hypothesis 
that representatives are cognizant of their political surroundings when making roll-call 
decisions.  According to the results of Table 5.1, a one point decrease in a House 
member’s NTU score is associated with an approximate 10 point change in state 
partisanship and an approximate nine point change in state ideology.  It appears that 
representatives do take into account the prevailing political landscape beyond their own 
district and consider their states in totality to some degree in decision-making.  The 
political environment beyond their district does have influence on decision-making for 
spending issues.   
In addition, the ideological disposition of House members’ district constituency 
effects those members’ voting behavior.  The “top down” simulation of district constituency 
ideology developed by Ardoin and Garand (2003) does appear to permit one to estimate 
the impact of constituency preference or opinion on the roll-call voting of legislators.  
According to the model results, a one point change in a House member’s NTU 
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conservatism is associated with an approximate five point change in district conservatism.  
While not a replacement for true constituency opinion at the district level, this measure 
seems to capture the nature of ideology for congressional districts.  As such, the spending 
conservatism on budgetary legislation by House members decreases as those district 
constituencies become more liberal. 
The district contextual environment measures also lend support to the specification 
of the model.  Based upon the findings from Table 5.1, increases in district urbanization 
decreased the fiscal conservatism of House members.  A 33% increase in the 
urbanization of a congressional district lowers a representative’s NTU score by one point.  
This lends some support to the theory proposed by Wagner’s Law that increases in the 
interdependence created by urban society increases pressure for government spending.  
The same support is not observed in the finding for the median income coefficient.  An 
interpretation based upon Wagner’s Law suggests that increases in income should result 
in increased demands for government service.  The positive coefficient associated with 
spending conservatism suggests empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this 
hypothesis.  According to the results of Table 5.1, a $10,000 increase in district median 
income results in a one point increase in NTU scores.  Alternatively, the measure of 
median district income may be considered to be a measure of relative district affluence.  If 
the competition for many scarce government resources and services are decided and 
allocated by need, representatives from those more affluent districts may be less inclined 
to vote for services that will not affect their constituencies.   
Also, the spending conservatism of House members declines as the proportion of 
African-American increases in those districts.  According to the results of Table 5.1, an 
8% increase in black district population is associated with a one point decline in House 
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member NTU scores1.  This is consistent with the hypothesized effect.  Insofar as 
African-Americans are a Democratic constituency, an increase in their proportion of a 
district’s population should increase the likely hood of democratic representation is a 
district, with the attendant lower NTU scores.  In fact, there is a significantly negative 
correlation between Republican representation and black proportion in a congressional 
district (correlation = .30, sig. > .001).  Furthermore, African-American’s make 
substantial demands on the government for services and support.  It stands to reason 
that increases in the African-American population, on average, will make attentive 
legislators more inclined to support spending by government that will benefit their 
constituencies. 
Finally, the level of congressional district federal outlay dollars also has a 
significant effect on House member’s roll-call decisions on spending issues.  The results 
indicate that a 3.4 billion dollar increase in district outlays is associated with a one point 
decline in fiscal conservatism on roll-call voting on spending measures when other 
measures are controlled.  While a change of this magnitude only effects about a quarter 
of the congressional districts, the range of outlays available in the Appendix suggests 
that outlays could account for a several point decrease in the NTU scores of 
congressional members with significant levels of spending in their districts.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the main significance of this measure is to confirm that the 
effect of government employment remains important beyond the spending level in 
congressional districts2. 
                                               
1   An interaction between African-American proportion and government employment produced no 
appreciable change in the results, indicating that the empirical finding of government employment effects is 
not an artifact of black population in congressional districts. 
2   Although not reported, this effect survives the interaction of government employment with 
federal outlays, retaining its significance and influence. 
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In summary, the results of the core model reported in Table 5.1 indicates that there 
is a relationship between the proportion of government employees in a congressional 
district and the budgetary roll-call voting by House members, as measured by those 
member’s NTU scores.  While the relationship is modest in impact, with a possible change 
of 6.3 points in a representative’s NTU score, it is still a significant change and an 
independent influence when the varied other explanations for roll-call decision-making are 
controlled.   
Confirmatory empirical evidence to support the core hypothesis is illustrated Table 
5.2.  An analysis of the influence of the same predictors for each Congress provides the 
same results for the impact of government employees on the budgetary roll-call voting 
behavior of House members.  In every instance, the coefficient for the proportion of 
government employees in a congressional district is significant and in the correct direction,  
with a range from b = 61.91 to b = 16.19.  This indicates that there is some fluctuation in 
the effect of government employees over individual congresses, but that this effect is 
always significant in nature.  Furthermore, the R-square for these models follows the lead 
of the pooled model in Table 5.1 in that they explain a significant proportion of the variance 
in NTU scores in each congress.  The R-squares for these congressional year models are 
between .6923 and .9469.  These congressional year models demonstrate the robustness 
of the measure of government employment across congresses and illustrate that the 
findings associated with the pooled model are not an artifact of the large number of cases 
in that pooled model.  Also, the individual congress results in Table 5.2 suggest that the 
impact of bureaucrats can almost triple the pooled model coefficient during some 
congresses.  Furthermore, the findings from the core specification of the model suggest 
the need to explore a little deeper into the influence of government employees on 
representatives. 
b t b t b t b t
District Gov't Employ % (-) -39.1757 -1.976** -51.1308 -3.191*** -56.1958 -3.55*** -61.4342 -4.403***
Party ID (+) 12.7574 5.812*** 13.7447 7.987*** 9.4910 5.266*** 11.2248 7.302***
ADA Score (-) -0.2821 -8.411*** -0.1335 -4.663*** -0.2048 -7.253*** -0.1772 -6.961***
Seniority (-) -0.2761 -5.208*** -0.2255 -5.031*** -0.2296 -5.314*** -0.1277 -2.708***
State PID (-) -0.2484 -3.955*** -0.2447 -4.968*** -0.1936 -4.414*** -0.1725 -3.795***
State Ideology (-) -0.2208 -2.148** -0.1738 -2.168** -0.1465 -1.953** -0.0930 -1.267   
District Ideology (-) -0.1251 -1.738** -0.0697 -1.113   -0.1320 -2.368*** -0.0469 -0.854   
District Urbanization (-) -0.0414 -1.307*  -0.0133 -0.476   -0.0371 -1.273   -0.0236 -0.856   
District Median Income % (-) 0.0006 3.412*** 0.0005 3.495*** 0.0006 3.549*** 0.0005 3.429***
District Black % (-)  0.0043 0.111   0.0061 0.182   0.0079 0.251   0.0214 0.747   
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0003 -0.604   0.0001 0.156   0.0001 0.196   0.0004 1.237   
Constant 42.5449 8.913*** 39.0936 9.460*** 38.4624 9.464*** 40.1101 10.812***
R-square:
b t b t b t
District Gov't Employ % (-) -61.9136 -4.556*** -38.6896 -3.033*** -16.1881 -1.862** 
Party ID (+) 18.2327 9.575*** 26.1991 11.892*** 22.4602 9.323***
ADA Score (-) -0.2367 -7.749*** -0.3558 -11.774*** -0.2757 -8.188***
Seniority (-) -0.2623 -4.557*** -0.2867 -6.265*** -0.1887 -6.107***
State PID (-) -0.2096 -4.503*** -0.0758 -1.535*  -0.0539 -1.775   
State Ideology (-) -0.1280 -1.512*  0.0426 0.496   0.0064 0.113   
District Ideology (-) 0.0049 0.076   -0.0201 -0.559   -0.0221 -0.941   
District Urbanization (-) -0.0198 -0.630   -0.0121 -0.473   -0.0019 -0.128   
District Median Income % (-) 0.0006 3.746*** 0.0001 1.501*  0.0000 0.703   
District Black % (-)  0.1070 3.264*** -0.0175 -0.714   -0.0959 -4.878***
District Federal Outlays (-) 0.0001 0.791   -0.0001 -0.762   0.0001 0.569   
Constant 41.1443 10.541*** 55.6192 12.699*** 58.6091 17.232***
R-square:
Dependent Variable is each House Member's NTU Score for each Congress
t-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Individual Congress Cross-Sectional Regression Models
Table 5.2
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
103rd Congress 104th Congress
(1983-1984) (1985-1986)











BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: PARTISAN EFFECTS 
Are Democratic and Republican House members equally responsive to the 
influence of public-sector employees in their districts?  In the classic sense, one would 
hypothesize that a constituency suspected of a great desire to increase government 
spending would necessarily gravitate toward the Democratic Party, no doubt due to the 
traditional Democratic Party’s inclination for governmental solutions to societal issues.   In 
this regard, government employees would function much in the same way as other 
reelection constituencies have functioned in the literature.  This functionality would mean 
that Democratic House members would be very responsive to government employees as 
a core reelection constituency and react accordingly with an increased propensity to spend 
government resources with increases in the proportion of the district composed of 
bureaucrats.  On the other hand, Republicans would be uninspired by the demands of a 
reelection constituency so ideologically consistent with the Democratic Party.  Republicans 
would appear either unresponsive to changes in the level of government employment in 
their districts, or could even become more conservative in an appeal to their base 
supporters in the effort to counteract any effect of a Democratic government employee 
core constituency. 
An alternative approach may suggest just the opposite result.  This approach 
suggests that government employees behave as rational actors seeking to maximize the 
likelihood of their effectiveness in the political marketplace and utilizing their vote 
accordingly.  This behavior is consistent with the assumption inherent to the hypothesis of 
this dissertation that government employees are acting as a core constituency seeking the 
reward of increased or maintenance in government spending in return for their support 
electorally.  This reelection constituency would not be governed in the same partisan or 
ideological way that other cores constituencies in the literature have been demonstrated to 
behave.  In this relationship, actions (and not ideology) cement the linkage.  This 
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pragmatic, or some may say cynical, approach does not mean that government 
employees are not generally a Democratic Party reelection constituency.  Quite the 
opposite.  Instead, this argument suggests that government employees may become 
Republican reelection constituencies if Republican House members are appropriately 
reserved in their budgetary roll-call voting behavior.  With incumbency returning most 
incumbents to Washington D.C with regularity, government employees may make the 
rational choice to support Republican candidates when there is either no viable alternative 
or the Republican incumbent is moderate enough in their roll-call behavior on spending 
policy.  In essence, government employees may be trading their effectiveness as a core 
reelection constituency to Republicans for moderation in the fiscal conservatism or those 
members.  Furthermore, Democratic House members may appear unresponsive to 
changes in government employee proportions in their constituencies, as these House 
members are already predisposed to vote for increases or maintenance in spending levels 
regardless of the bureaucratic effect.   
This alternative possibility finds support the difference in means for NTU scores for 
Democrats and Republicans and the difference in standard deviations in NTU scores for 
the two parties.  The Democratic House member mean NTU score is 26.96 while 
Republican House member mean NTU score is 59.34.  The Democratic NTU standard 
deviation is 9.4 while the Republican NTU score standard deviation is 15.2.  This data 
demonstrates that Democrats are already very liberal in their voting on spending matters 
and don’t have as much variation away from this liberal score in their membership.  
Conversely, Republicans are more conservative in their NTU scores, but have a much 
wider variability in those scores.  This is not exactly shocking news, but it does suggest 
that a self-interested reelection constituency, such as government employees, has more 
room to influence Republican voting behavior than their Democratic counterparts.  What 
does this hypothesizing portend?   
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The results reported in Table 5.3 give some indication as to how the relationship 
between government employment and roll-call behavior differs by party.  The difference in 
the relationship for Democratic and Republican House members is estimated by including 
an interaction variable for party and government employment. The non-interaction 
government employment variable represents the effects of district public-sector 
employment on NTU scores for Democrats; the interaction variables reflect the difference 
in effect for Democrats and Republicans.  The estimated effect of public-sector 
employment on spending restraint for Republican House members can be calculated by 
adding the coefficients for the non-interaction and interaction variables.  As the results for 
the interaction model indicate, it is Republican House members who are most strongly 
affected by the proportion of government employees in their districts. In Table 5.3, the 
coefficient for district government employment, reflecting the effect of this variable for 
Democrats, is not in the expected direction (b = 9.7515), and fails to approach 
conventional levels of statistical significance.   
It appears as if Democratic House members are virtually unresponsive to the level 
of government employment in their districts.   After controlling for the effects of other 
variables, Democratic House members are relatively and uniformly more liberal in their 
roll-call voting on budgetary issues than Republicans.  This is evidenced by the coefficient 
for the party variable, coded in the Republican direction (b = 26.5155; t = -10.110) that 
suggests that Republicans have average NTU scores that are almost 27 points higher 
than Democrats.  The plot thickens when we examine the partisan interaction measure.  
The coefficient for the party-employment interaction variable is negative and highly 
significant (b = -127.7373; t = -4.085).  This coefficient suggests that Republicans are very 
responsive to the level of public-sector employment in their districts.   
In essence, Republicans representing districts with relatively large numbers of 
government employees are more liberal in their roll-call voting on spending policy, while 
 b Z Score
District Gov't Employ % (-) 9.7515 0.945   
Republican Gov't Employ % (-) -127.7373 -4.085***
Party ID (+) 26.5155 10.11***
ADA Score (-) -0.2410 -13.269***
Seniority (-) -0.2848 -7.27***
State PID (-) -0.0955 -2.817***
State Ideology (-) -0.1466 -2.521***
District Ideology (-) -0.2151 -8.461***
District Urbanization (-) -0.0239 -1.348*  
District Median Income % (-) 0.0000 0.993   
District Black % (-)  -0.1375 -5.32***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0005 -2.852***
99th Congress 4.0043 11.422***
100th Congress -3.1213 -7.459***
101st Congress 2.4915 5.213***
102nd Congress 5.0112 9.563***
103rd Congress 7.1091 6.432***
104th Congress 15.7734 14.871***
Constant 46.7045 18.937***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7886
Number of obs      =      2942
Number of groups   =       764
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       3.9
max                =        15
Wald chi2(18)      =   8667.79
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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Table 5.3
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Partisan Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model
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Republicans representing districts with fewer government employees tend to remain 
strongly oriented toward fiscal conservatism.  Conversely, Democrat House members 
respond almost randomly to variation in the strength of public-sector employees in their 
districts, though the coefficient for the party variable indicates that Democrats are 
systematically less supportive of fiscal restraint--at least as defined by the NTU--than 
Republicans. 
 The magnitude of the coefficients can be used to estimate the effects of district 
government employment on roll-call spending orientations for Democrat and Republican 
House members. The coefficient for Democrats (b = 9.7515) suggests that a 10% increase 
in government employment in a House district represented by a Democrat would result in 
only a .975 decline in a member’s NTU scores.  This reflects a substantively trivial effect of 
government employment on NTU scores for Democrat House members.  Conversely, the 
effect for Republican House members can be estimated by adding the non-interaction 
coefficient with the interaction coefficient, yielding an effect for Republicans of –117.986.  
Therefore, a 10% increase in district government employment generates a predicted 
decline in NTU scores of -11.7 points for Republican House members, holding constant 
the effects of the other independent variables in the model.  Ultimately, these coefficients 
suggest that there is a substantial effect of government employment in Republican-held 
districts, while government employment has no substantial effect on Democratic House 
members. 
  What explains the disparate influence of district government employment on the 
roll-call voting behavior concerning government spending for Democrats and 
Republicans?  The results found in Table 5.3 suggest that Republican House members 
are more responsive than Democrats to the preferences of government employees, who 
are undoubtedly among the most politically-active, politically-sophisticated constituents 
that legislators are likely to face in their districts.   This finding and the attendant supporting 
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evidence in Table 5.3 suggest that the second, pragmatic hypothesis proposed above is in 
effect.3 
As hypothesized, to the degree that government employees act collectively, they 
are probably somewhat more likely to be seen as a clientele group for Democratic 
candidates.  Given this predisposition, much of the influence of government employees on 
the behavior of Democratic House members may have already occurred at the electoral 
level.  For Republicans, government employees may be seen as electorally "in play," since 
they are unlikely to be mainstays of the Republican coalition.  Republicans in districts with 
a high proportion of government employees may perceive themselves as having some 
chance of earning support from government employees in subsequent elections if they are 
less conservative in their budgetary roll-call behavior.  Democrats, on the other hand, may 
be in a better position to assume at least some level of electoral support by government 
employees, at least in relation to their Republican challengers.  As evidenced by the 
findings in Table 5.3, Democrats exhibit relatively high levels of support for enhanced or 
maintained government spending regardless of district government employment.  In other 
words, since Democrats are already more likely to be more supportive of an enhanced 
public sector, the potential impact of government employees in Democrats' districts is 
marginalized.  Conversely, Republican House members may vary in their support for 
government spending, and may recognize that they can make inroads among government 
employees if they temper their tendencies toward fiscal conservatism in budgetary roll-call 
voting.   
 In summary, the question regarding the partisan effect on bureaucratic influence 
has been empirically answered.  Democrats are unresponsive to government employees, 
                                               
3 I tested several models to determine if competition or marginality might explain the partisan 
differences found in this analysis.  I found no marginality or competition effect concerning government 
employment influence.  While these effects are certain to effect the decision-making of representatives, the 
influence of government employees appears to be maintained at all levels of electoral competition. 
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while Republicans are more responsive.  I suggest that the reasons behind this behavior 
have motivations within both camps: government employees and representatives.  
Government employees are seeking support for an enhanced public sector to protect their 
life satisfaction; House members are seeking constituencies that can be counted upon to 
produce on election day.  Since Democratic House members are already relatively liberal 
in their voting on budgetary items, there isn’t much slack in the electoral chain for 
government employees to pull.  Conversely, Republicans in search of a highly motivated, 
politically savvy constituency for reelection support or in fear of a highly motivated, 
politically savvy constituency bent on their ouster may be more amenable to altering their 
roll-call voting to accommodate these constituencies to the benefit of their reelection 
prospects. 
BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING: 
ELECTION CYCLE EFFECTS 
 
 Does the cycle of elections have an effect on bureaucratic influence?  To 
examine this potential effect, I investigate the differences between mid-term and 
presidential elections for government employee effects.  I find that the effects of 
partisanship continued to be supported when the potential for election cycle effects are 
examined.  To understand the rationale behind any potential election cycle effect it is 
imperative to recall the most appealing characteristic of government employees to any 
potential political suitor.  That characteristic is the participation rate of government 
employees.  Previous literature has demonstrated a consistent and significantly higher 
turnout rates for government employees when compared to the remaining electorate.  
My discussion of the impact of turnout in Chapter 3 referenced previous research that 
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has demonstrated a consistent pattern of higher turnout by government employees, with 
the most drastic differences occurring during the mid-term election cycle.4   
This higher turnout rates is reasonable to predict given the hypothesized nature 
of government employee motivations.  If this is a reelection constituency with strong 
motivational impetus to support their candidate of choice on election day, government 
employees should maintain support regardless of the election cycle.  Because of the 
nature of the particular self-interested motivation, this group should be less undone by 
the relatively passive nature of mid-term congressional elections.  Government certainly 
doesn’t stop spending money during midterm congress.  Government employees, unlike 
other sectors within the electorate, do not need the attention of presidential election 
years to stimulate their turnout.  Therefore, the turnout differential in midterm election 
years should increase the relative influence of government employees in the electorate, 
as their participation remains constant and the remaining electorate declines in its 
participation rate.  Appling the bureaucratic power index (Borcherding, 1977), this 
approximate 15% turnout differential leads to government employees averaging over 
20% of the electorate during midterm elections.  This certainly makes government 
employees a significant potential contributor to election outcomes during the midterm 
and certainly a sound political investment to candidates seeking reelection 
constituencies to enhance their election prospects.  
 The initial results of the test of midterm congressional effects are reported in the 
results of Table 5.4.  The hypothesis that government employees have a stronger impact 
during off year elections is supported by the findings.  First, the level of government 
employment matters in presidential election years, as evidenced by the statistical  
                                               
4 Blair (1993) finds that mid-term election turnout differences averaged over 14%, while 
Presidential election year turnout differences averaged approximately 9 %.  Furthermore, the explanatory 
value of government employment is only significant in midterm elections when included in a comprehensive 
multivariate analysis. 
b Z Score
District Gov't Employ % (-) -20.2254 -1.991** 
Midterm * Gov't Employ % (-) -15.7481 -2.245** 
Party ID (+) 16.8586 12.468***
ADA Score (-) -0.2451 -13.23***
Seniority (-) -0.2778 -6.862***
State PID (-) -0.1032 -3.07***
State Ideology (-) -0.1374 -2.411***
District Ideology (-) -0.2202 -8.51***
District Urbanization (-) -0.0321 -1.834** 
District Median Income % (-) 0.0001 1.354*  
District Black % (-)  -0.1258 -4.651***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0003 -1.963** 
Midterm Congress 8.0500 6.267***
99th Congress -2.5086 -2.305** 
100th Congress -3.1818 -7.56***
101st Congress -4.1006 -3.927***
102nd Congress 4.7864 9.171***
104th Congress 15.0971 14.158***
Constant 50.3124 20.146***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7849
Number of obs      =      2942
Number of groups   =       764
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       3.9
max                =        15
Wald chi2(18)      =   8447.36
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Table 5.4
98th to 104th Congress (1983 to 1996)
Midterm Effects Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model
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significant coefficient of -20.2254 (t = 1.991).  This finding means that a 10% increase in 
government employment in a congressional district results in a two percent decline in 
representative’s NTU scores.  Secondly, the midterm does appear to provide some 
additional strength to the affect of government employment on the NTU scores of House 
members (b = -15.7481; t = -2.245).  Midterm congresses almost result in the doubling of 
the effect of government employment.  Midterms produce an additional 1.5 percent 
decline in fiscal conservatism for every 10% increase in government employment.  
Therefore, midterm congresses result in a 3.5 percent (2% + 1.5%) decline in NTU 
scores for every 10% increase in government employment in congressional districts. 
 The results of a separate analysis of midterm and presidential election year 
congresses and party differences are found in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.  Once again, the 
model fits the data quite well (psuedo-R2 = .779 and .786, respectively).  Furthermore, 
the general pattern follows the partisan differences discovered in the assessment of 
potential party effects on bureaucratic influence.  In both midterm and presidential 
election year congresses, Republican House members are found to be strongly and 
significantly effected by the number of government employees residing in their districts, 
while Democratic House members are decidedly unresponsive to levels of government 
employment in their districts.  Furthermore, the hypothesized increase in the influence of 
government employees between midterm and presidential year congresses is confirmed.  
As Tables 5.5 and 5.6 indicate, the Republican coefficient for government employment 
increases between presidential and midterm congresses (b = 98.455 to b = -165.386).  
In essence, a 10% increase in government employment in a Republican congressional 
district produces a 9.8 % drop in NTU spending score conservatism in congresses 
immediately preceding presidential election years, and a 16.5 % decrease in congresses 
immediately preceding midterm election years.  This represents over a 50% increase in 
the sensitivity to the level of government employees in Republican House districts during  
 b Z Score
District Gov't Employ % (-) 10.3204 0.717   
Republican Gov't Employ % (-) -165.3864 -4.683***
Party ID (+) 27.4633 9.129***
ADA Score (-) -0.2725 -13.584***
Seniority (-) -0.2332 -5.89***
State PID (-) -0.1124 -2.9***
State Ideology (-) -0.0885 -1.387*  
District Ideology (-) -0.2441 -7.039***
District Urbanization % (-) -0.0125 -0.584   
District Median Income (-) 0.0001 1.084   
District Black % (-)  -0.1313 -5.212***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0006 -3.294***
101st Congress -1.3570 -3.838***
103rd Congress 2.7771 2.015** 
Constant 55.2552 15.961***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7180
Number of obs      =      1262
Number of groups   =       638
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       2.0
max                =         7
Wald chi2(14)      =   2924.61
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model
Table 5.5
Midterm Elections for Congress (1983 to 1996)
 b Z Score
District Gov't Employ % (-) 2.4240 0.236   
Republican Gov't Employ % (-) -98.4554 -3.399***
Party ID (+) 23.8280 9.36***
ADA Score (-) -0.2522 -12.728***
Seniority (-) -0.2775 -8.357***
State PID (-) -0.1200 -3.773***
State Ideology (-) -0.1598 -2.799***
District Ideology (-) -0.1649 -6.171***
District Urbanization % (-) -0.0158 -1.034   
District Median Income (-) 0.0001 2.151** 
District Black % (-)  -0.0992 -4.658***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0002 -1.492*  
100th Congress -3.2059 -7.684***
102nd Congress 4.6762 9.097***
104th Congress 14.5735 14.131***
Constant 45.3556 17.724***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7794
Number of obs      =      1680
Number of groups   =       735
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       2.3
max                =         8
Wald chi2(15)      =   7151.96
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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Table 5.6
Presidential Elections for Congress (1983 to 1996)
Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series Regression Model
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midterm congresses.  Additionally, the remaining control measures maintain their 
consistency and similar relative impact on the dependent variable, increasing the 
confidence that the change between midterms and presidential year congresses in 
Republican responsiveness is related to government employment levels.  Clearly, there 
is a midterm effect in the influence of government employees on the spending roll-call 
voting of Republican members of Congress. 
BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE ON ROLL-CALL VOTING:  
FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL EFFECTS 
 
 In the final specification of the model, I disaggregate the government employee 
variable into its federal, state, and local government components.  I expect to find that 
federal government employees have the strongest effect on the roll-call behavior of 
representatives.  I suspect that state and local government employees will also have an 
effect on the fiscal conservatism of representatives, but that this effect will be less robust.  
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that federal government employees are the 
ones that are most directly affected by the spending level of the federal government.  
Therefore, those employees should be motivated to bring influence to bear with the most 
fervor.  Conversely, state and local officials, while affected by federal spending levels due 
to intergovernmental transfers of dollars to states by the federal government, are also 
affected by the spending practices of the state and local governments.  By including 
separate independent variables for federal, state, and local government employment, any 
change in the influence of the components of government employment can be discerned.  
 The results of Table 5.7 appear to demonstrate the validity of the hypothesized 
effect.  Federal government employees are the only sector of public employment to have a 
statistically significant effect on the roll-call spending behavior of representatives (b =    -
49.6546; t = -2.838).  This finding suggests that a 10% increase in federal government 
 b Z Score
District FED Gov't Employ % (-) -49.6546 -2.838***
District ST Gov't Employ % (-) 0.2072 0.0100   
District LOC Gov't Employ % (-) -0.1998 -0.005   
Party ID (+) 16.6959 12.326***
ADA Score (-) -0.2476 -13.345***
Seniority (-) -0.2798 -6.908***
State PID (-) -0.1046 -3.079***
State Ideology (-) -0.1489 -2.683***
District Ideology (-) -0.2349 -8.745***
District Urbanization % (-) -0.0288 -1.616*  
District Median Income (-) 0.0001 1.761** 
District Black % (-)  -0.1315 -5.233***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0005 -2.445***
99th Congress 3.9773 11.185***
100th Congress -3.0860 -7.258***
101st Congress 2.4849 5.098***
102nd Congress 5.0264 9.249***
103rd Congress 6.6393 5.763***
104th Congress 15.2424 13.712***
Constant 49.3390 16.207***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7857
Number of obs      =      2942
Number of groups   =       764
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       3.9
max                =        15
Wald chi2(28)      =   9474.78
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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employment results in a 4.9 % decline in representative NTU scores.  The effect of state 
and local government employees is random and trivial.   
 The disaggregation of government employees into its federal, state and local 
components by political party produces some very interesting insights into the nature of 
bureaucratic effects on the spending inclinations of House members.  The results are 
represented in Table 5.8.  The coefficients for the control variables and the overall model's 
explanatory power are consistent with the previous iterations of the model of bureaucratic 
influence (Pseudo R2 = 0.794) and the control measures are consistent with previous 
models as well. 
From the results of Table 5.8, it appears as if Democrats are indeed responsive to 
the proportion of federal government employees in their House districts, but that this effect 
is lost in the aggregation of the measure of government employment.  The findings 
indicate that a 10% increase in the proportion of government employees in a Democratic 
congressional district is associated with a 4.1 point decline in Democratic House member 
NTU scores.  Conversely, the same 10% increase in state or local government employees 
will produce increases in budgetary conservatism among Democratic House members 
(+3.3% for state government employees and +27.5% for local government employees).  
Clearly, Democratic House members respond as originally expected to federal 
government employees, but they are unresponsive – or else responsive in the wrong 
direction – to state and local employees.   
The effect for Republican House members is just the opposite.   Republican House 
members are unresponsive to federal government employee levels in their districts, but 
they are very responsive to state and local government employee levels in their districts.  
A 10% increase in state government employment is associated with a 6.3 point drop in 
NTU roll-call fiscal conservatism and a 10% increase in local government employment is 
associated with a 57.7 point decrease in NTU scores for Republican House members.   
 b Z Score
District FED Gov't Employ % (-) -41.4986 -3.238***
District ST Gov't Employ % (-) 32.7383 1.54*  
District LOC Gov't Employ % (-) 274.5089 5.179***
REP District FED Gov't Employ % (-) -23.4602 -0.662   
REP District ST Gov't Employ % (-) -63.3272 -1.899** 
REP District LOC Gov't Employ % (-) -576.6124 -9.74***
Party ID (+) 48.4968 14.789***
ADA Score (-) -0.2363 -13.431***
Seniority (-) -0.2676 -6.704***
State PID (-) -0.0842 -2.412***
State Ideology (-) -0.1591 -2.774***
District Ideology (-) -0.2080 -7.879***
District Urbanization % (-) -0.0346 -2.012** 
District Median Income (-) 0.0001 1.547*  
District Black % (-)  -0.1664 -6.656***
District Federal Outlays (-) -0.0007 -3.933***
99th Congress 4.1349 11.977***
100th Congress -3.0051 -7.22***
101st Congress 2.6095 5.413***
102nd Congress 5.2507 9.631***
103rd Congress 7.4738 6.698***
104th Congress 15.9014 14.764***
Constant 34.2346 9.889***
Dependent Variable is each ith House Member's NTU Score for the tth Congress
Z-Scores are based on White's Heteroscedastic Robust Standard Errors 
*** = significant at the .01 level (one-tailed test)
**  = significant at the .05 level (one-tailed test)
*   = significant at the .10 level (one-tailed test)
Pseudo R-square    =     .7937
Number of obs      =      2942
Number of groups   =       764
Obs per group: min =         1
avg                =       3.9
max                =        15
Wald chi2(22)      =   9474.29
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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Clearly, Republican House members are very sensitive to the proportion of state and local 
government employees in their districts, while Democratic House members are sensitive 
to the level of federal government employees in their districts. 
What is the dynamic at work that would cause such differentiation in 
responsiveness between Republican and Democratic House members?  It may be the 
case that Democrats and Republicans have different ideological belief systems relative to 
the role of different levels of government.  By this I mean to suggest that the parties see 
different roles for government in society.  Republicans are generally though of as 
supporting the idea of a federalist system of decentralized government.  They are 
supportive of efforts to return decision-making and political control to state and local 
governments.  Republicans are often supporters of divesting the federal government of 
control over public policy and limiting the size and scope of federal government 
involvement in the pubic policy making.  Conversely, Democrats are often most closely 
associated with federal government promotion and the centralization of decision-making. 
They seek solutions to public issues through federal government solutions and 
administration.  As a result, members of the two parties may perceive their political support 
as differentiated by the different sectors of bureaucratic employment.  Because they are 
more supportive of state and local government, they may be more responsive to this 
reelection constituency, while Democrats seek support from federal government 
employees. 
 Similarly, the government employees of each sector may also perceive 
themselves as more consistent reelection constituencies to the party that is more 
sympathetic to their role in government.  State and local government employees may 
see Republican candidates as supporters of local and state control of government and 
more sympathetic in their roll-call voting on spending policy for state and local 
governments.  Furthermore, this support could extend to non-spending matters as well.  
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If state and local government employees view Republican representatives as supporters 
of the enhancement of their level of government, that support could be perceived as 
increasing their security and life satisfaction.  Conversely, federal government 
employees may see Democrats as their standard bearer.  They may believe that 
Democrats will be more supportive of an expanded federal government role, and lend 
their support as a reelection constituency accordingly.  These perceptions by House 
members and government employees would not be inconsistent with the rational choice 
supposition made of government employee motivation.  It would also be consistent with 
the disposition of House members to identify and seek support from the constituencies 
with which they identify and with which they can find ideological consistency in their roll-
call voting decision calculus. 
SUMMARY 
 
 What has the empirical evidence demonstrated about the relationship between 
government employees and members of the House of Representatives?  First, the 
evidence demonstrates the unequivocal effect of government employment on the roll-call 
voting behavior of House members.  For each iteration of the model tested, government 
employment has a statistically significant effect on the level of fiscal conservatism of 
House members.  The findings also reveal the mediating effect of the election cycle on 
the influence of the public sector.  Evidence suggests that representative become more 
responsive to the level of government employment in their districts leading up to midterm 
elections than in congresses leading up to presidential elections.  It is hypothesized that 
this increased effect is due to the higher turnout rates for government employees in 
midterm election years.  In those elections, government employees represent a larger 
proportion of the electorate, which increases their attractiveness to legislators.  
Therefore, House members become more attentive to this sub-constituency during the 
midterm in the effort to garner their support.   
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 Finally, and most interestingly, a partisan differential is discovered.  This 
relationship is depicted in Appendix C.  The results of the analysis illustrate that 
Republicans are more attentive to government employees than Democrats.  Democrats 
appear to be unresponsive to government employees, while Republicans are significantly 
more responsive.  I argue that Democratic House members are already relatively liberal in 
their voting on budgetary items, therefore there isn’t much more that government 
employees could ask of Democratic House members.  Conversely, Republicans may 
discover that they can cultivate this core constituency for their reelection efforts by become 
more moderate in their roll-call fiscal conservatism.  The disaggregation of government 
employment into federal, state and local sectors produces some surprising partisan 
results.  Republican House members are attentive to the core constituency of state and 
local government employees, while Democratic House members are attentive to federal 
government employees.  I suggest that this differential roll-call responsiveness to each 
constituency may be due to differences that each party sees for the role of government in 
society.  Republicans are attentive to the desires of state and local government employees 
because they support advent of that level of government in society, while Democrats are 
responsive to federal government employees because they are supportive of the role that 







 I began the research that became this dissertation with the thought of merging 
the strengths of two literatures to examine the extent of bureaucratic influence on 
legislative responsiveness.  The literatures concerned with legislative representation and 
government growth have occupied the research agendas of many scholars over the 
previous decades.  Legislative research has identified the multitude of factors that can 
mediate the level of responsiveness by legislators to their constituencies.  Individual 
factors, such as seniority, and constituency factors, such as demographics, have been 
shown to affect the responsiveness of legislators.  Research has also indicated the 
variation in responsiveness to different sub-groups within legislator’s constituencies, 
which have typically been related to reelection constituencies or supporting coalitions 
that provide political support to elected officials.   
Literature on government growth has introduced the theory that bureaucrats can 
promote an increase in the growth of government by utilizing their voting strength in the 
electorate.  They use this voting strength to elect candidates that are more sympathetic 
to increased government spending, thereby increasing their own security and life 
satisfaction.  It seems to me that the combination of these two literatures of 
representation and government growth has the potential to complement each other on 
the issue of bureaucratic influence on legislative decision-making.  Could government 
employees be thought of as a core constituency?  Could they use electoral voting 
strength to alter the roll-call decision-making of legislators?  These questions are the 
central thesis of this dissertation.  It is my belief that I have answered those questions 





SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE 
 
 An examination of the literature concerning elections, participation, and the 
political behavior of bureaucrats certainly indicates the potential to be a core 
constituency.  If candidates and parties are targeting mobilization toward subgroup they 
consider supportive within district constituencies, government employees have the 
qualities that candidates should be interested in cultivating.  The relationship between 
government employees and representatives is certainly a plausible theory.   
The empirical findings from the bureau voting model, while equivocal, do support 
some ideological and political distinctions between government employees and other 
citizens and significant differences in political participation.  Government employees, as 
rational self-interested actors, do appear to desire increased, or at least maintained, 
levels of government spending and certainly participate at a higher rate than the 
remaining population.  It is also plausible that politicians, who are interested in 
maintaining political and electoral support, will gravitate toward such participatory 
segments of the electorate as a constituency.  If reelection is the central to the decision-
making calculus of representatives, they should be attentive enough to modify their 
political behavior to garner the support of a group such as bureaucrats. 
 The empirical evidence demonstrated in this dissertation has illustrated several 
conclusive findings about the relationship between government employees and 
representatives.  First, the findings show the significant moderating effect of government 
employment on the roll-call fiscal conservatism of representatives.  Secondly, the 
findings reveal the mediating effect of the election cycle the bureaucratic effect.  My 
research demonstrates that representatives are more responsive to government 
employment in the midterm congresses than in presidential congresses.  I suggest that 
this behavior is the effect of higher turnout rates for government employees in midterm 
election years.  In those elections, government employees represent a larger proportion 
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of the electorate, which increases their attractiveness to legislators.  Finally, I identify a 
party effect on bureaucratic influence.  This relationship is depicted in Appendix C.  
Analysis indicates that it is Republicans representatives that are more attentive to 
government employees than Democrats.  I suggest that Democratic House members are 
already relatively liberal in their roll-call behavior on fiscal policy, which doesn’t leave much 
reason for bureaucrats to persuade this group with electoral support or threats.  
Conversely, Republicans may discover that they can cultivate this core constituency for 
their reelection efforts by become more moderate in their roll-call fiscal conservatism.  The 
disaggregation of government employment into federal, state and local sectors produces 
some surprising partisan results.  Republican House members are attentive to the core 
constituency of state and local government employees, while Democratic House members 
are attentive to federal government employees.  I suggest that this differential roll-call 
responsiveness to each constituency may be due to differences that each party sees for 
the role of government in society. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BUREAU VOTING MODEL 
 
 The central focus of this dissertation is the pursuit of evidence that government 
employees are an influential reelection constituency to members of the House of 
Representatives.  Fortunately, the examination of this question of bureaucratic influence 
has provided some confirmatory evidence for the bureau voting model.  Recall that the 
bureau voting model suggests that the growth in the size of government is affected by the 
differences between the voting behavior of government employees and other citizens.  
The theory contends that bureaucrats are utility maximizers who covet increased 
government expenditures to promote their relative life satisfaction.  Therefore, they will 
be motivated to higher rates of participation than the remaining population in the 
electorate, which is borne out in the literature on this theory.  It is suggested that this 
increased likelihood political participation will produce the effect of government 
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employees having a proportionately greater effect on election outcomes and public 
policy than the remainder of the population.  This self-interested voting behavior should 
be directed toward the support of increased government spending to promote greater job 
security and life satisfaction, but should also contribute to higher rates of government 
growth. 
 The representational linkage illustrated in this dissertation also provides supporting 
evidence for the bureau voting model.  The bureau voting model suggests that public-
sector employees are more likely than other citizens to cast votes on election day, and by 
so doing provide electoral advantages to candidates who support their policy agenda, and 
this dissertation, by examining how government employees residing in congressional 
districts affect the roll-call spending behavior of their representatives, has produced an 
alternative test of this theory.  Because the examined relationships between government 
employees and representatives are most likely the end product of processes implied by 
the bureau voting theory, the empirical evidence that government employment is linked to 
roll-call voting behavior for budgetary matters provides is evidence in support of the 
bureau voting model.   
 In essence, I have produced an alternative empirical test of the bureau voting 
model by seeking to understand the influence of government employees on the spending 
behavior of legislators.  This alternative test produces some clarity in the implications of 
the bureau voting model and provides insight into the effects of public sector employees 
on the roll-call behavior of House members.  Because representatives do appear to 
moderate their fiscal conservatism to attract support from the bureaucracy as a supporting 
coalition, the result may be increases in the size of government.  The illustration of this 





SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 
 
 The investigation of government employees as a subgroup constituency to 
members of Congress also yields confirming evidence for the existence of a general 
representational linkage between representatives and their constituents.  This linkage 
has a long tradition in the representational literature.  This dissertation has only served 
to confirm many of the accepted beliefs about the nature of that relationship.  Most often, 
these relationships are examined as a study of the roll call voting behavior of elected 
officials as a function of some constituency attributes or pressure that these actors 
perceive from their constituencies.  Scholars develop measures of constituency policy 
preferences and legislative roll-call behavior, and then link the two measures in a 
multivariate model to ascertain the degree to which roll-call behavior is responsive to the 
policy views of legislative constituencies.  This dissertation has followed in that tradition 
and operationalized a model of legislative responsiveness as a function of government 
employment levels in congressional districts. 
In properly specifying the model of responsiveness to government employment, I 
have confirmed many previous findings regarding the mediators on the representational 
linkage.  The control variables included in the model are repeatedly found to have an 
effect on the roll-call voting behavior of legislators.  The independent variables 
representing legislator characteristics are all found to have a significant effect on roll-call 
behavior.  House member’s partisanship has a strong influence on roll-call voting on 
government spending policy, as measured by the National Taxpayer’s Union roll-call 
voting score.  Republicans partisanship is found to result in more fiscally conservatism.  
Furthermore, House members’ ideology is also influential in their roll-call vote decisions.  
The analysis of my core model indicates that the higher Americans for Democratic Action 
ratings for House members results in the less fiscally conservative in voting on spending 
measures.  These findings confirm previous research results that ideology and 
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partisanship are good predictors of legislative roll-call behavior.  Also, seniority is found to 
have an effect on roll-call voting.  The findings indicate that House member seniority 
reduces fiscal conservatism.  These results suggest that more senior representatives are 
indeed more responsive to their constituencies.   This dissertation also illustrates strong 
empirical support for the effect of constituencies on the roll-call decision making of 
legislators.  State partisanship, state ideology and district ideology are all related to House 
member’s roll-call behavior, which confirms the influence of constituency preferences on 
the decision calculus of representatives.   
It is in the literature concerning the effect of distinct subgroups within a legislator’s 
constituency that this dissertation makes the largest contribution to the research on 
representation.  Research illustrates that subgroups within the constituency can have a 
greater influence on the voting behavior of representatives than the more diffuse 
population of a district.  Scholars contend that constituencies are complex and made up 
of many subgroups, some of which are politically active.  Some of these core 
constituencies form a supporting coalition or reelection constituency for representatives.  
Partisan and racial subgroups have been identified in the literature, and have shown 
distinctly greater influence over representatives believed to be consistent with their 
preferences.  Because of the strong relationship revealed between government 
employees and representatives, the results of this dissertation lend support to the 
literature on constituency subgroup effects. 
SOME AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The discovery that government employees seem to constitute a reelection 
constituency to House members, but that this reelection constituency operates differently 
at different sectors of government employment suggests that additional inquiry is needed 
into the dynamic at work to produce this effect.  I have offered the suggestion that the 
difference in partisan responsiveness is potential a function of the different ideological 
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disposition of the two parties toward the role of government.  State and local employees 
support Republican’s based on their federalist tendencies, while federal employees 
support Democrats based on their espousal of federal government supremacy.  
 While this explanation may be plausible, it is by no means the only potential 
answer.  The examination of survey data to establish the underlying characteristics of 
federal, state and local government employees may uncover differences that may explain 
the differences in responsiveness to these groups by Democratic and Republican House 
members.  Ideological or political dispositions may differ between these different sectors of 
the public sector.  Also, the collection of interview data for representatives could certainly 
help clarify the relationship between legislators and government employee and further 
detail the effect I have illustrated.  
  Furthermore, an examination of each individual vote choice included in the NTU 
score may yield additional information.  A subdivision of those votes into the different 
areas of funding by government could produce answers for the partisan differences, and 
indicate the true nature of the bureaucratic effect.  By separating out the different funding 
mechanisms and sectors, and applying more diversity to the spending roll-call behavior of 
representatives, a clearer picture of the effect of each of these roll-call decisions could be 
modeled.   
 Survey data could also yield another information and clarity for the explanation of 
the general party differences revealed in this dissertation.  Recall that in the baseline 
model of partisan differentials, Republicans demonstrated a strong responsiveness to 
changes in government employment levels in their districts, while Democrats were 
unresponsive to such changes.  This finding runs counter to past research on the linkage 
of bureaucratic voting behavior and government.  This past research has hypothesized 
that government employees will support candidates who are supportive of public-sector 
spending and an active role for government and it is understandable that this assumption 
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would be made because of the evidence that Democrats are more supportive than 
Republicans of a more activist and pro-active public sector.   
 I offered another possible rationale for the unusual finding of Republican 
responsiveness.  I suggested that government employees are utilizing different, or at least 
more complicated, voting cue than the average citizen.  Bureaucrats have much more of a 
personal stake in election outcomes and therefore may engage in a more complicated 
vote choice rationale.  In strongly Democratic districts, or in non-competitive Democratic 
elections, government employees may indeed use simple partisan voting cues.  In such 
districts, this is likely to be a safe bet, since Democrats are typically more supportive of 
enhanced spending than are Republicans.  However, in strong Republican districts, or in 
non-competitive Republican elections, government employees might not be inclined to 
waste votes by voting simply with their party cue, but may instead utilize information on the 
predisposition of competing candidates to support the role and spending levels of 
government.  By shifting votes to Republican candidates, they do not waste their votes by 
voting for a Democratic candidate who is highly unlikely to win, and by doing so they 
increase their chances of developing a role in influencing Republican candidates and, 
eventually, Republican House members.  This theoretical voting scheme may be tested 
given the proper survey data and information on the competitiveness of districts and 
incumbency.  Furthermore, the examination of government employee strength and the 
behavior of newly elected representatives could further enhance the understanding of the 
relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. 
 Regardless of further investigation, this dissertation has successfully merged the 
strengths of two literatures of bureaucratic influence and legislative representation.  I 
have demonstrated the validity of identifying government employees as a core 
constituency to representatives.  Furthermore, I have uncovered both election cycle and 
partisan difference effects that mediate on that relationship.  The results have also given 
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support to the bureau voting theory of government growth and given support to the 
legislative representation literature, especially with regard to the existence and 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES MODELED 
3025 97.00 .00 97.00 40.5126 20.11861 404.759
3045 .2342 .0421 .2763 .100748 .0287969 .001
3045 .1745 .0059 .1804 .022392 .0181128 .000
3045 .1108 .0060 .1168 .028295 .0171440 .000
3045 .0846 .0174 .1020 .050061 .0104169 .000
3042 1.00 .00 1.00 .4188 .49344 .243
2983 100.00 .00 100.00 47.7821 34.42509 1185.087
3045 51.00 .00 51.00 8.7011 8.26706 68.344
3010 53.06 -20.57 32.49 7.3881 8.30845 69.030
3010 28.74 -27.32 1.42 -12.0331 7.11303 50.595
3045 82.18 -46.71 35.47 10.6582 13.66765 186.805
3045 55765.00 8434.00 64199.00 24614.3415 9403.83938 88432195
3045 86.90 13.10 100.00 74.0744 22.38963 501.296

















N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance
 
3025 97.00 .00 97.00 40.5126 20.11861 404.759
1266 77.5000 19.5000 97.0000 59.337283 15.2402753 232.266
1754 66.5000 8.5000 75.0000 26.992873 9.4668082 89.620
3045 .2342 .0421 .2763 .100748 .0287969 .001
1274 .2089 .0426 .2514 .099324 .0292656 .001
1768 .2342 .0421 .2763 .101784 .0284420 .001
3045 .1745 .0059 .1804 .022392 .0181128 .000
1274 .1745 .0059 .1804 .021720 .0194996 .000
1768 .1742 .0062 .1804 .022887 .0170470 .000
3045 .1108 .0060 .1168 .028295 .0171440 .000
1274 .1023 .0067 .1090 .027976 .0158707 .000
1768 .1108 .0060 .1168 .028520 .0180201 .000
3045 .0846 .0174 .1020 .050061 .0104169 .000
1274 .0740 .0183 .0923 .049628 .0102657 .000









REP Federal Gov't Employment
DEM Federal Gov't Employment
State Gov't Employment
REP State Gov't Employment
DEM State Gov't Employment
Local Gov't Employment
REP Local Gov't Employment
DEM Local Gov't Employment
Valid N (listwise)









BIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR  DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN 
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FREQUECIES FOR NTU SCORES AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT VARIABLES 
FOR POOLED MODELS 
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REPUBLICAN HOUSE MEMBERS AND NTU SCORES 
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DEMOCRATIC NTU SCORES FOR THE 100TH CONGRESS 
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